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ARTICLES 
REGULATING FINANCIAL INNOVATION: A 
MORE PRINCIPLES-BASED PROPOSAL? 
Dan Awrey 
INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis has exposed the complexity of modern 
financial markets. One of the primary drivers of this complexity has been 
financial innovation. From sub-prime mortgages, securitization, and credit 
default swaps to sophisticated quantitative models for measuring and 
managing risk, the footprints of financial innovation can be found at almost 
every step along the road to the Great Recession. More broadly, complexity 
and innovation—its nature and its pace—have combined to generate 
significant asymmetries of information and expertise between public 
regulators and private (regulated) actors and exacerbated the agency cost 
problems that pervade global financial markets. At the same time, the pace 
of innovation has left financial regulators and regulation chronically behind 
the curve. Identifying the optimal policy response to the complexity and 
nature and pace of innovation within financial markets is, accordingly, 
vitally important in terms of the delivery of effective financial regulation. 
Astonishingly, however, none of the proposals for regulatory reform which 
have emerged in response to the crisis—including the recently enacted Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act1—directly address the 
challenges posed by these seemingly ubiquitous forces. 
With a view to redressing this somewhat glaring oversight, this paper 
examines the desirability of “more principles-based” financial regulation (or 
MPBR) as a potential response to the challenges stemming from the 
complexity and innovativeness of modern financial markets. The focal 
point of this examination is thus the philosophy or style of financial 
regulation: it is concerned with who generates substantive regulation (and 
outcomes) within regulatory regimes and how, as opposed to the 
institutional structure, statutory construction, or substantive content of 
regulation, in and of themselves. MPBR is itself a recent innovation—
cutting against the historically predominant trend toward prescriptive, rules-
based approaches to financial regulation. MPBR experienced a surge in 
momentum in the decade or so prior to the crisis, with comprehensive 
principles-based regimes pursued by the United Kingdom (U.K.) Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), the Australian Securities and Investment 
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Commission (ASIC) and other jurisdictions, most notably Canada, showing 
signs of moving in a similar direction. In the wake of the crisis, however, 
MPBR has been the target of significant—and, as I will argue, largely 
misguided—criticism. 
Sailing against this prevailing current, this paper advances the scholarly 
and public policy debates surrounding the optimal approach toward 
financial regulation in three ways. First, it describes the core principle 
underlying MPBR and demonstrates how this principle transcends the now 
stale “rules versus principles” debate. Second, using over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives markets as a case study, it illustrates the pervasiveness 
and significance of asymmetries of information and expertise and agency 
(incentive) problems within complex, innovative financial markets and how 
MPBR manifests the potential to address many of the attendant regulatory 
challenges. Finally, and more broadly, this paper seeks to move the debate 
beyond the structure, perimeter, and even substance of regulation, and 
toward the examination of questions respecting the optimal philosophy of 
regulation given the complexity and innovation within modern financial 
markets. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Part I canvasses the 
traditional rules versus principles dialectic and examines its shortcomings 
as a determinant of public policy. Part II introduces MPBR—its core 
principle, the preconditions to its successful implementation and, if 
implemented, its wisdom and potential challenges—and illustrates how this 
emerging philosophy of regulation transcends the formalism of the 
traditional (arrested) dialectic. Employing the regulation of OTC derivatives 
markets as a case study in complexity and innovation, Part III illustrates 
how carving out a role for MPBR can ameliorate asymmetries of 
information and expertise vis-à-vis regulators and regulated actors, 
constrain agency costs, promote substantive harmonization, and generate 
more responsive and durable regulation. At the same time, it examines the 
challenges to the successful implementation of MPBR, especially in terms 
of fostering trust between regulators and regulated actors and minimizing 
the prospect of regulatory capture. Part IV concludes with some preliminary 
observations respecting the broader potential applications of MPBR. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL RULES VERSUS PRINCIPLES DIALECTIC 
A. THE TRADITIONAL DIALECTIC 
The debate respecting the optimality of rules versus principles (or 
standards2) as mechanisms for delivering the content of legal norms 
                                                                                                                 
 2. The terms “principles” and “standards” are often used interchangeably in the theoretical 
literature. Some scholars, however, have employed the term “standard” in a manner encompassing 
both rules and principles. See Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral Evidence on the Effects of Principles-
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represents one of the most enduring dialectics in all of legal thought. This 
dialectic incorporates both descriptive and normative elements. As a 
descriptive matter, both rules and principles are often viewed as being 
comprised of two basic components: triggers and responses.3 Where rules 
and principles diverge, according to this view, is in their respective 
approaches toward the design of each of these components. The archetypal 
rule prescribes both the empirical substance of the trigger and the precise 
response thereby elicited, leaving only factual issues to be determined by 
the decision-maker (whether it be a prosecutor, judge, or regulatory 
authority).4 The archetypal principle, in contrast, leaves both the trigger and 
response to be determined by the decision-maker on the basis of an 
underlying evaluative framework.5 
Beyond such highly stylized conceptions, legal scholars have attempted 
to differentiate between rules and principles on the basis of, inter alia, their 
locus on a continuum from generality to specificity,6 their temporal 
orientation,7 the degree of discretion which they confer upon regulated 
actors,8 and the position they occupy within the hierarchy of norms.9 
Ultimately, however, the largely binary nature of these attempts fails to 
reflect that, in reality, it is perhaps more accurate—and in any event more 
useful—to view rules and principles as “endpoints of a spectrum”10 
integrating each of these variables (and potentially many others). 
Simultaneously, it seems important to acknowledge that more complex 
norms may contain both rules and principles11 and, as a corollary, the 
                                                                                                                 
and-Rules-Based Standards, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 91 (2003). As Lawrence Cunningham observes, 
the term “standards” is also increasingly used to denote measures of performance or conduct, in 
particular those promulgated by non-governmental organizations. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A 
Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities 
Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1419 (2007). To avoid confusion, this paper 
uses the term “principle” wherever possible. “Norm,” meanwhile, will be used as a generic term 
encompassing both rules and principles. 
 3. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381 (1986). See also Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–88 
(1976). 
 4. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 565–67 (1992); Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 
14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 803–04 (2005); Schlag, supra note 3, at 381–83. 
 5. See Schlag, supra note 3, at 381–83. This underlying evaluative framework may itself be 
specified ex ante to varying degrees or left entirely to the ex post discretion of the decision-maker. 
The degree to which this framework is transparent to those other than the decision-maker may also 
vary widely in practice. 
 6. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1420. 
 7. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 567; Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. 
REV. 953, 961 (1995). 
 8. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1422; Nelson, supra note 2, at 91. 
 9. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 966. 
 10. Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 
79 OR. L. REV. 23, 26 (2000). 
 11. See id. at 27.  
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tendency of rules and principles to blur into one another over time.12 
Viewed from this perspective, it seems almost inevitable that the vast 
majority of regulatory regimes will in practice contain a mixture of both 
rules and principles.13 Indeed, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part 
II, this is one of the rationales underlying the FSA’s branding of its 
regulatory approach as simply more principles-based.14 
The generic normative arguments for and against both rules and 
principles will be instinctively familiar to every student of the law.15 Indeed, 
the conceptual pattern of these arguments map on to some of the most 
venerable debates—common law versus equity, codification versus judicial 
discretion—in annals of legal discourse. So engrained are these arguments 
in legal thinking that they endure despite the absence of any unanimity 
within the traditional dialectic regarding the appropriate basis for evaluating 
the relative merits and drawbacks of each mechanism.16 The benefits of 
rules derive from their precision.17 By drawing a sharp line between 
prohibited and permissible conduct, precision promotes greater 
predictability: lowering the transaction costs of decision-making for those 
subject to rules, thus encouraging planning and, ultimately, a more efficient 
allocation of resources.18 At the same time, by constraining the discretion of 
those who must apply them, the relative precision of rules also promotes 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Schauer, supra note 4, at 805–06; Schlag, supra note 3, at 428–29. 
 13. Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities 
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 10 (2008) [hereinafter Ford, New Governance]. 
 14. Id. at 9. 
 15. Indeed, these arguments have become so generic as to induce Pierre Schlag to characterize 
them as “drearily predictable, almost routine.” Schlag, supra note 3, at 380. 
 16. As Ford observes: “scholars have evaluated rules and principles in economic terms, 
abstract normative ones, in terms of regulatory design and behavioral analysis, and on the basis of 
particular values such as freedom/autonomy, democracy, community, or perceived legitimacy.” 
Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 8 (citations omitted). For an economic analysis, see 
Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 257 (1974); Kaplow, supra note 4; Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs 
of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985). For an abstract normative analysis, 
see Kennedy, supra note 3. For a behavioral analysis, see Korobkin, supra note 10; Nelson, supra 
note 2; Schauer, supra note 4. From the perspective of regulatory design, see IAN AYRES & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); 
Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983). From the 
perspective of freedom/autonomy, see Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 115–16 (1997). From the perspective of democratic values, see 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). Finally, from 
the perspective of community, see Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 577 (1988). 
 17. Schlag, supra note 3, at 384. Indicia of precision, as the term is employed here, include, 
but are not limited to, the specificity of both a norm’s trigger and its response, its transparency 
(the use of language with well defined and universally accepted meanings within the relevant 
community) and its accessibility (the easy application of the rule to concrete situations). Diver, 
supra note 16, at 67–68. 
 18. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 969, 972. 
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greater formal equality19 and minimizes the potential for bias, arbitrariness, 
abuses of power, and rent seeking behavior on the part of decision-
makers.20 
Rules, however, are not without their drawbacks. The drafters of rules 
are invariably afflicted by cognitive and temporal constraints (i.e. bounded 
rationality21) which undermine their ability both to draft rules which 
encompass all future contingencies and to foresee the unintended 
consequences of their drafting choices.22 The utilization of rules thus 
manifests the risk that they will be rendered anachronistic by subsequent 
developments.23 Furthermore, rules are by their very nature either over-
inclusive (capturing behaviors which should be excluded) or under-
inclusive (failing to capture behaviors which should be included).24 To the 
extent of this over- and/or under-inclusiveness, rules generate incentives 
which are incongruent with their underlying purposes.25 More specifically, 
this emphasis of form over substance incentivizes those subject to rules to 
engage in: (1) activities up to the boundary of permissible conduct;26 and 
(2) welfare-reducing creative compliance and regulatory arbitrage. As 
explained by Lawrence Cunningham: “rules can be blueprints for evading 
their underlying purposes. Bright lines and exceptions to exceptions 
facilitate strategic evasion, allowing artful dodging of a rule’s spirit by 
literal compliance with its technical letter.”27 Finally, as Cass Sunstein has 
suggested, rather than minimizing the potential for bias, abuses of power, 
and rent seeking behavior, rules may simply serve to drive such phenomena 
underground.28 
The traditional dialectic views the benefits and drawbacks of principles 
as in many respects the mirror images of those typically associated with 
rules. In stark contrast with the precise bright-line tests residing at the heart 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at 974–75. 
 20. Rose, supra note 16, at 591; Schlag, supra note 3, at 386; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 974–
75. 
 21. “Bounded rationality . . . is a semistrong form of rationality in which economic actors are 
assumed to be ‘intendedly rational, but only limitedly so.’” OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 45 (1985) (citing HERBERT A. SIMON, 
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxiv (2d ed. 1961)). The concept of bounded rationality is grounded 
in the notion that, if the mind is a scarce resource, there will exist temporal and cognitive 
constraints on our ability to process information. Id. at 45–46. 
 22. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 957, 993. 
 23. Id. at 993–94. As discussed in greater detail infra, this assertion rests in large measure on 
assumptions respecting the high transaction costs of amending an anachronistic rule. 
 24. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1689. Thus, for example, the archetypal rule with a pre-
determined response will not distinguish between flagrant and technical violations. Schlag, supra 
note 3, at 386. 
 25. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 16, at 268; Korobkin, supra note 10, at 36; Sunstein, supra 
note 7, at 992–93, 995. See also Diver, supra note 16, at 73. 
 26. Schlag, supra note 3, at 384–85. 
 27. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1423. 
 28. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 994–95. 
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of rules, the primary benefits of principles derive from their flexibility and 
resulting durability in the face of changing factual circumstances and 
evolving customs and understandings.29 This contextual sensitivity is often 
viewed as enabling principles to retain a greater degree of congruence with 
their underlying purposes as compared with relatively static prescriptive 
rules.30 The dual traits of flexibility and durability also render principles 
more difficult to manipulate than rules—thereby frustrating opportunities 
for both creative compliance and regulatory arbitrage. Finally, as will be 
explored in greater detail in Part II, the use of principles can provide the 
foundation and impetus for dialogue. As explained by Pierre Schlag: 
“[b]ecause standards are cast in evaluative terms, they place the onus on the 
parties to work out and communicate their intentions completely and 
thoroughly.”31 By promoting communication between drafters, decision-
makers, and those subject to their application, principles thus manifest the 
potential to generate greater contextualized understandings (thereby 
enhancing precision, certainty, and predictability) and, simultaneously, 
ameliorate the potential adverse effects of bounded rationality and various 
forms of bias, abuses of power, and rent seeking behavior. 
The drawbacks of principles derive, first and foremost, from a 
perceived absence of precision. Remaining faithful to the traditional 
dialectic (at least for the moment), the absence of precision undermines the 
certainty and predictability of norms formulated on the basis of principles.32 
Principles are thus frequently criticized as rendering entitlements uncertain, 
thereby increasing transaction costs, discouraging careful planning and, 
ultimately, resulting in the sub-optimal allocation of resources.33 It has also 
been advanced that, to the extent that principles eschew clearly defined 
boundaries between prohibited and permissible conduct, they serve to chill 
risk-averse actors from engaging in otherwise acceptable behaviors.34 The 
absence of precise bright-line triggers and prescribed responses is also the 
source of concerns that the use of principles may lead to erratic results by 
decision-makers, further compounding their uncertainty and 
unpredictability.35 Building on this theme, critics often point to the 
opportunities that principles generate for abuses of discretion on the part of 
decision-makers which, in addition to generating deadweight losses, may 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation, 3 CAPITAL MARKETS 
L.J. 425, 426 (2008) [hereinafter Black, Forms and Paradoxes]; Kaplow, supra note 4, at 616–17; 
Schauer, supra note 4, at 804. 
 30. See Julia Black et al., Making a Success of Principles-based Regulation, 1 LAW & FIN. 
MARKETS REV. 191, 193 (2007). 
 31. Schlag, supra note 3, at 388. 
 32. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 958. 
 33. Id.; Rose, supra note 16, at 609. 
 34. Schlag, supra note 3, at 385. 
 35. Id.  
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render their application increasingly incongruent with their underlying 
purposes.36 
What becomes evident from the recitation of these largely boilerplate 
arguments is that the traditional dialectic offers no clear predictions 
respecting the optimality of rules versus principles and, thus, few (if any) 
useful policy prescriptions. Indeed, the most we can extract from the 
dialectic is that the relative desirability of rules and principles will depend 
on both the design of a particular norm and the circumstance in which it is 
applied.37 It is a question of horses for courses. This state of affairs has 
prompted Pierre Schlag to observe that “[t]his dialectic doesn’t go 
anywhere. It is an arrested dialectic: There is no moment of synthesis.”38 
B. THE DIALECTIC REDUX: A QUESTION OF COSTS 
The traditional dialectic has more recently been recast in terms of the 
transaction and social costs stemming from: (1) the generation of legal 
norms; (2) their subsequent application by decision-makers; and (3) the 
resulting incentive effects on those subject to their application. This of 
course makes perfect sense. In the absence of transaction costs, drafters 
would be able to design infinitely precise norms contemplating the entire 
universe of possible contingencies and ensuring absolute congruence with 
their underlying purposes. Simultaneously, those subject to norms would 
possess a complete understanding of how they apply to their precise 
circumstances (thereby encouraging future planning and the efficient 
allocation of resources) and be wholly dis-incentivized from engaging in 
creative compliance or regulatory arbitrage (thereby eliminating potential 
social costs). Yet we live in a world of transaction (and thus social) costs in 
which drafters, decision-makers, and subjects face potentially significant 
financial, technological, cognitive and temporal constraints. It seems 
reasonable, therefore, to suggest that the relative costs of rules versus 
principles play an important role in determining their optimality. 
Conventional wisdom holds that the generation of rules will typically 
involve the incursion of greater ex ante transaction costs attributable to the 
time and effort expended by drafters to articulate the empirical substance of 
triggers and match each trigger with the appropriate response.39 Thereafter, 
the expectation is that these upfront costs will translate into lower ex ante 
transaction costs for both decision-makers (applying rules) and subjects 
(evaluating the potential application of rules to their current and 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id.; Diver, supra note 16, at 90–92; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 958. Diver characterizes the 
potential for such abuses as the hidden transaction costs of controlling subordinate decision-
makers. Diver, supra note 16, at 90. 
 37. Diver, supra note 16, at 75–76. 
 38. Schlag, supra note 3, at 383. 
 39. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 16, at 267; Kaplow, supra note 4, at 562; Korobkin, supra 
note 10, at 31–32. 
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contemplated future conduct). The same conventional wisdom holds that 
principles, meanwhile, to the extent that they defer judgments as to the 
substance of triggers and the appropriate response to the point of 
application, impose greater ex ante transaction costs on both decision-
makers and subjects.40 Utilizing this ex ante/ex ante framework, scholars 
have emphasized the importance of both the frequency and 
homo/heterogeneity of triggering fact patterns as potential determinants of 
the optimality of rules versus principles.41 Scholars have also highlighted 
the potential private and social costs flowing from the over/under-
inclusiveness of rules42 and, conversely, the perceived lack of certainty and 
predictability surrounding principles.43 
Ultimately, however, the conventional wisdom respecting the 
transaction and social costs of both rules and principles is almost as 
unsatisfactory as the traditional dialectic in which it is so deeply rooted. The 
preponderance of this wisdom remains empirically untested and, 
accordingly, must be approached with caution as a potential driver of public 
policy. More importantly for the present purposes, the two-dimensional 
transaction cost analyses which flow from this dialectic fail to adequately 
account for the long-term, iterative nature of the relationships between 
drafters, decision-makers, and subjects within many regulatory regimes. 
Indeed, as will be explored in Part II, the agency and transaction cost 
ramifications of more principles-based financial regulation provide perhaps 
the most intuitive illustration of how this emerging regulatory philosophy 
transcends the traditional (arrested) dialectic. 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 32–35. Although, as Korobkin explains, this is an over-
simplification:  
  Predicting what behaviors are within the law’s boundaries might be more costly 
under a standard than under a rule, but this is likely to depend on the content of the 
standard. Standards that require adjudicators to judge citizens’ actions on the basis of a 
cost-benefit analysis demand considerable effort on the part of citizens who wish to 
conform to the law in order to avoid sanctions. However, standards that require 
adjudicators to judge citizens’ actions on the basis of whether those actions comply 
with community norms might require even less effort for citizens to understand than 
would rules. 
Id. at 35. 
 41. Kaplow, supra note 4, at 577; Korobkin, supra note 10, at 37. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra 
note 7, at 972–74. According to this view, rules are more likely to represent the optimal response 
to frequently recurring and homogeneous fact patterns (essentially owing to economies of scale), 
whereas principles are more likely to represent the optimal response to less frequent and more 
diverse fact patterns (where over/under-inclusiveness are intuitively more likely to raise 
problems). Sunstein, supra note 7, at 972–74. 
 42. See generally Diver, supra note 16. 
 43. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 31–35. 
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C. THE DIALECTIC DISTILLED: A QUESTION OF 
VALUE TRADEOFFS 
Before shifting the examination to more principles-based financial 
regulation, however, it is worth briefly considering the following question: 
if the traditional dialectic is truly arrested, why has it proven so enduring? 
One potentially compelling explanation is that the dialectic is simply a 
reflection of far more fundamental normative disputes between competing 
values: certainty versus flexibility, uniformity versus individualization, 
stability and security versus dynamism.44 Along the same vein, rules and 
principles can be seen as representing conflicting visions of the world.45 
According to this view, whereas rules are designed to ring fence undesirable 
conduct in a world of self-interested individuals, principles are designed to 
promote “good” and “altruism”46 in a world inclined toward collectivism. 
Approached from this perspective, the traditional dialectic can be distilled 
down to a series of value tradeoffs.47 Stated bluntly, the optimality of rules 
versus principles becomes a question of perspectives and priorities. While 
conceptualizing the dialectic in such terms does not serve to liberate it 
(indeed, quite the opposite), rendering transparent these competing visions, 
values, and priorities is arguably a necessary pre-condition to meaningful 
debate respecting the optimal design of public policy. 
II. THE DIALECTIC TRANSCENDED: MORE PRINCIPLES-
BASED FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Without a doubt, the emergence of more principles-based financial 
regulation (or MPBR) represents one of the most important regulatory 
developments within global financial markets in these, the early (and 
heady) years of the 21st century. Yet in the wake of the global financial 
crisis, this emerging philosophy of regulation has become a lightning rod 
for criticism. Much of this criticism stems from the association of MPBR 
with the FSA (long a “thought leader”48 in the field), its so-called “light 
touch" approach to regulation, and its perceived culpability for failing either 
                                                                                                                 
 44. For a more thorough list of these competing values or, as Schlag characterizes them, 
“virtues” and “vices,” see Schlag, supra note 3, at 400. 
 45. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1766–76. 
 46. Id. at 1742, 1773–74; Rose, supra note 16, at 592. See also Schlag, supra note 3, at 418–
22. 
 47. Schlag, supra note 3, at 400–01. 
 48. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON 
OUTCOMES THAT MATTER (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf 
[hereinafter FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT]; see also Black et al., supra note 30; 
EXPERT PANEL ON SEC. REGULATION, CREATING AN ADVANTAGE IN GLOBAL CAPITAL 
MARKETS: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (2009), available at 
http://www.expertpanel.ca/eng/documents/Expert_Panel_Final_Report_And_Recommendations.p
df [hereinafter EXPERT PANEL REPORT]. See generally Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities 
Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL L.J. 257 (2010) [hereinafter 
Ford, Global Financial Crisis]; Ford, New Governance, supra note 13. 
282 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
to predict the gathering storm or fix the leaking roof whilst the sun still 
shined. It has not helped that MPBR has also been widely misunderstood.49 
Consequently, this section begins by asking, what is more principles-based 
financial regulation? 
MPBR is frequently described as encompassing a move away from 
detailed, prescriptive rules toward more high-level principles in establishing 
the parameters within which regulated actors are required to conduct their 
business activities.50 The “more” in MPBR, in part, reflects this shift: the 
baseline comparator being historically predominant rules-based approaches 
toward financial regulation. Viewed from this perspective, however, the 
distinction between MPBR and purely prescriptive, rules-based approaches 
effectively boils down to one of statutory construction and interpretation, 
with the resulting normative debate revolving primarily around the relative 
desirability of rules versus principles within the enforcement context.51 This 
perspective is, on one level, correct. A move toward MPBR would 
necessarily entail a shift in terms of statutory construction toward the 
articulation of broader principles.52 This shift would, in turn, have 
repercussions in terms of both statutory interpretation and enforcement. 
However, viewed solely from this narrow, formalist perspective, MPBR 
simply forms part of—and risks ultimately being subsumed within—the 
traditional (arrested) dialectic. 
While the broader theoretical debate has undeniably influenced its 
development, MPBR deserves to be decoupled from the traditional dialectic 
for two reasons. First, rather than contemplating the wholesale 
abandonment of rules, MPBR envisions that rules and principles can play 
complementary re-enforcing roles within a regulatory regime (this, in turn, 
is the second rationale for characterizing MPBR as simply “more” 
principles-based).53 Indeed, MPBR reflects a tacit acknowledgement that 
                                                                                                                 
 49. A piece of anecdotal evidence illustrating the level of misunderstanding is provided by 
Cristie Ford. Ford notes that “87.5% of the 75 written submissions from stakeholders” to Canada’s 
Expert Panel on Securities Regulation were in favor of MPBR. Ford, Global Financial Crisis, 
supra note 48, at 266. However, as Ford observes: “a substantial number seemed to assume that 
principles-based and rules-based regulation were at opposite extremes, and that a move to a more 
principles-based system meant substantially eliminating rules no matter how efficient or necessary 
they might be.” Id. 
 50. Black et al., supra note 30, at 191; FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 
48, at 6. 
 51. In particular with respect to the possibility of so-called “regulation by enforcement.” See, 
e.g., James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 634 
(2007); Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead 
at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 166–67 (1990). 
 52. See Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 435. See also infra Part II.B. 
 53. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 4. See Black et al., supra 
note 30, at 192; Ford, Global Financial Crisis, supra note 48, at 266. This vision has been 
explained by Julia Black: 
There are strong arguments for saying that a tiered approach to rule design should be 
adopted—principles need an under-pinning of detailed rules in some areas—and 
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the effectiveness of a regulatory regime in delivering desired regulatory 
outcomes is a product not just of statutory design, but also institutional 
philosophy.54 Second, the theoretical core of MPBR clearly transcends the 
engrained formalism of the traditional dialectic. As explored in Part II.A., 
the pith and substance of MPBR is not concerned with the institutional 
structure, statutory construction, or even the content of financial 
regulation—it is concerned with who generates that regulation and in what 
sort of environment they generate it. 
A. MPBR IN THEORY: THE CORE PRINCIPLE 
The traditional rules versus principles dialectic reflects a legal-centric 
view which conceptualizes regulation as emanating exclusively from the 
power of the state to generate and enforce “the law.”55 The pervasiveness of 
this view is evidenced by the fact that proponents of both rules and 
principles share a marked tendency in their arguments to presuppose that 
there exist two (and only two) groups of actors, each performing mutually 
exclusive functions: one generating, monitoring, and enforcing norms (the 
state) and another complying with them (subjects). As depicted in Figure 1, 
this top-down, command-and-control paradigm envisions a world in which 
communication between regulators and regulated actors is effectively a one 
way street. 
Figure 1 
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Standing in stark contrast with the legal-centric paradigm, MPBR is 
premised upon an iterative, dialogic relationship within which regulated 
                                                                                                                 
detailed rules in turn need the support and coverage of principles to thwart strategies, 
which seek to exploit gaps and inconsistencies in those detailed provisions.  
Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 429–30. 
 54. See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles 
Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2003). 
 55. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89–96 (1961); HANS KELSEN, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY: A TRANSLATION OF THE FIRST EDITION 
OF THE REINE RECHTALEHRE OR PURE THEORY OF LAW 99 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & 
Stanley L. Paulson trans., Oxford University Press 1992) (1934). 
284 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
actors (and other stakeholders) are invited to play a potentially important 
role within the process of generating regulation. MPBR is thus a reflection 
of a more expansive (or “decentered”56) understanding of regulation which 
spans the public-private divide to encompass all forms of social control or 
influence—whether generated, monitored, and enforced via the apparatus of 
the state or other sources.57 This dialogic relationship also shares a number 
of traits with so-called “new governance” regulatory mechanisms.58 The 
basic dynamics of this relationship—examined in greater detail in Part 
II.B.—are depicted in Figure 2. 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation 2–3 (The London Sch. of Econ. and Pol. 
Sci. Centre for Analysis of Risk & Reg., Discussion Paper No. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Black, 
Critical Reflections]. 
 57. Credit for articulating this more expansive conception is often attributed to the work of 
Robert Ellickson regarding “non-legal” dispute resolution mechanisms developed by ranchers and 
farmers in Shasta County, California. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). This more expansive conception flows from the 
acknowledgement that instrumental public policy objectives are embedded within the design of, 
and normative discourses surrounding, these non-state sources of regulation. HUGH COLLINS, 
REGULATING CONTRACTS 56–62 (1999). 
 58. See Black et al., supra note 30, at 193; Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 5; Robert 
F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of 
the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 838 
(2010). The term “new governance” has grown to encompass a wide range of approaches to 
administrative governance emphasizing polycentric and collaborative regulatory structures which 
span the public-private divide and envision an important role for private (i.e. non-state) actors in 
shaping public policy and regulation. Weber, supra at 785. Perhaps most significantly, new 
governance mechanisms—much like MPBR—seek to harness the expertise of private actors in 
furtherance of public regulatory objectives. Id. at 838. In this respect, both MPBR and new 
governance can be understood as pragmatic responses to the increasing complexity within many 
fields of human endeavor. Other parallels between MPBR and new governance include: (1) a 
dynamic, flexible, and dialogic lawmaking process; (2) the use of flexible forms of legal norms; 
and (3) the retention of a strong public role in terms of the generation and, especially, enforcement 
of regulation. 
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Figure 2 
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It is this dialogic relationship which constitutes the core principle 
underlying MPBR. Principles themselves, while an integral element, are 
perhaps best understood as uniquely responsive and durable conduits 
through which this relationship generates and, importantly, updates 
regulation. The label “MPBR” is thus somewhat misleading: a more 
accurate (and less tainted) moniker perhaps being “dialogic regulation.” 
Such branding issues aside, and before exploring its wisdom and potential 
challenges, the next task is to identify the essential elements—the 
preconditions—necessary to establish and maintain the dialogic relationship 
envisioned by MPBR. 
B. MPBR IN PRACTICE: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS 
Taking the archetypal rules-based regime as a point of departure, the 
successful implementation of MPBR requires the fulfillment of at least four 
preconditions: (1) the identification and articulation by regulators of 
outcome-oriented principles; (2) a fundamental change in the philosophy of 
both regulators and regulated actors toward their respective roles in 
achieving desired regulatory outcomes; (3) the fostering of a new 
relationship between regulators and regulated actors premised on real trust, 
a more sophisticated dialogue, and shared understandings; and (4) a 
credible commitment by regulators to pursue a policy of intensive 
supervision combined with targeted and proportional (yet vigorous) 
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enforcement. These preconditions together make up the essential elements 
of MPBR. 
The first element is the identification and articulation by regulators of 
legal norms—formulated as regulatory principles—which identify the 
regulatory outcomes (or desired behaviors) they are designed to achieve (or 
incentivize), and not merely the technical rules and procedures with which 
regulated actors are expected to comply.59 This precondition flows from an 
acknowledgement (fundamental to MPBR) that regulated actors are often 
better positioned than regulators—owing to both their superior expertise 
and greater and more timely access to firm-specific and market 
information—to determine the technological content of the policies and 
procedures necessary to achieve desired regulatory outcomes.60 
Simultaneously, regulators are able to redeploy resources away from 
prescribing the technological content of regulation toward articulating the 
outcomes which regulated actors are expected to deliver, supervising 
compliance with these outcomes, and bringing targeted and proportional 
enforcement action to compel compliance.61 Ultimately, as Cristie Ford 
observes: “[s]ome version of outcome-oriented regulation is a necessary 
correlative to principles-based regulation, in that it is a responsible way to 
force accountability into a system that leaves the articulation of the content 
of those principles to on-the-ground actors.”62 
It is important at this juncture to distinguish between substantive and 
technological63 content for the purposes of MPBR. The substantive content 
of a principle is collectively made up of the animating principle itself (e.g. 
“a firm must conduct its business with integrity”), the statutory construction 
of any legal norms giving effect to this principle (e.g. anti-fraud 
provisions), the interpretive assumptions underpinning this statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 59. As explained by Dan Waters, the FSA’s principles-based approach involves “a shift of 
emphasis . . . away from looking at the processes carried out by firms, toward the outcomes we 
seek to achieve, for consumers, firms and markets.” Black et al., supra note 30, at 192 (quoting 
Dan Waters, Director of Retail Policy, Financial Services Authority, Speech at the ABI 
Conference: Implementing Principles-Based Regulation (Dec. 7, 2006)). A number of observers, 
and in some ways the FSA itself, understandably view MPBR and outcome-oriented regulation as 
representing distinct (albeit related) approaches to regulation. See, e.g., id. at 191. However, the 
symbiotic relationship between these approaches also provides ample justification for the view, 
advanced by scholars such as Cristie Ford, that MPBR represents a single and coherent philosophy 
of regulation. See Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 14. 
 60. Black et al., supra note 30, at 192. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 60. 
 63. In a previous article, I described technological content as “procedural” content. Dan 
Awrey, Principles, Prescriptions and Polemics: Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Canadian 
Investment Fund Industry, 32 DALHOUSIE L.J. 69, 86 (2009). I have changed the label to reflect 
what I think is a helpful distinction drawn by Cary Coglianese and David Lazer between 
regulation designed to intervene at the planning (management-based), acting (technology-based), 
and output (performance-based) stages. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based 
Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
691, 693 (2003). 
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construction (such as the common law definition of fraud) and, importantly, 
the desired regulatory outcomes (e.g. the promotion of confidence in 
financial institutions and markets). The technological content of a principle, 
on the other hand, consists of the policies and procedures implemented by 
regulated actors for the purpose of achieving desired regulatory outcomes. 
While responsibility for articulating the substantive content of principles 
resides with regulators, MPBR contemplates that the technological content 
of principles will in many cases be generated by regulated actors. It further 
contemplates that regulators will leverage the information and expertise of 
regulated actors when generating and updating substantive content. 
The outcome-oriented focus of MPBR envisions a fundamental change 
in the philosophy of both regulators and regulated actors64 toward their 
respective roles in achieving desired regulatory outcomes.65 There are 
several intertwined facets to this change. First, MPBR necessitates that 
regulators provide clear and robust guidance respecting the substantive 
content of principles.66 Second, to the extent that MPBR contemplates that 
the technological content of principles will be generated by regulated 
actors, it demands that regulators loosen their grip on the reigns of 
regulation and, in so doing, devolve responsibility to—and leverage the 
accumulated expertise of—regulated actors in vital areas such as risk 
management.67 This in turn requires that a good faith sphere be expressly 
carved out in which regulated actors are free to design and implement 
technological content with a view to achieving desired regulatory 
outcomes.68 Of particular importance in this regard is a philosophy of 
transparency, predictability, and restraint in the deployment of enforcement 
resources.69 In the absence of such a sphere, regulated actors are more likely 
to behave as though subject to prescriptive rules,70 thereby negating many 
of the prospective benefits of MPBR described in Part II.C. 
The outcome-oriented focus of MPBR concomitantly envisions a 
fundamental shift in the role and responsibilities of regulated actors within a 
regulatory regime. MPBR requires that regulated actors actively and 
meaningfully engage with principles at the highest level with a view to 
generating technological content capable of achieving desired regulatory 
outcomes. This contemplates both a more hands-on role for boards of 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Relative to historically predominant rules-based approaches to financial regulation. 
 65. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 6. 
 66. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 439. Mechanisms for disseminating such 
guidance include, but are not limited to, “official administrative guidance, speeches, ‘no action’ or 
‘Dear CEO’ letters, compliance audits, comments on industry standards, or specific enforcement 
actions.” Ford, Global Financial Crisis, supra note 48, at 278. 
 67. Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 27. 
 68. Black et al., supra note 30, at 200. 
 69. Id. at 197; Ford, Global Financial Crisis, supra note 48, at 288–89. 
 70. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 449; Steven L. Schwarcz, The ‘Principles’ 
Paradox, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 175, 176 (2009). 
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directors and senior management in terms of their oversight and 
stewardship of regulatory compliance matters71 and, simultaneously, a more 
strategic business role for firm compliance, risk management, and audit 
personnel.72 Importantly, it also contemplates a change in the mindset of 
(many) regulated actors. As explained by the FSA in the context of its 
migration toward a more principles-based regime: 
Firms must change their own behaviour and grasp the opportunities this 
presents for increased innovation and more flexible operations, while at 
the same time fully appreciating their regulatory responsibilities and 
ensuring that they deliver against them. 
This will mean a shift in focus from managing a legally driven process of 
compliance with detailed rules to managing the delivery of defined 
outcomes in a more flexible regulatory environment. 
. . . 
Effective compliance will evolve away from a primary focus on the 
designing, implementing and monitoring processes that embed detailed 
regulatory rules in business operations. Instead, it will increasingly require 
the exercise of judgment.73 
Accordingly, in addition to a potentially significant shift in the overall 
regulatory burden in terms of the generation of technological content, 
MPBR thus demands from regulated actors a deeper philosophical change 
in terms of their attitude and approach toward their role in achieving desired 
regulatory outcomes. 
The third essential element of MPBR contemplates a sea change in the 
relationship between regulators and regulated actors. This change springs 
from the rejection of the prescriptive, command-and-control relationship of 
regulated (dis)trust, enforced through an adversarial process, which has 
generally characterized financial regulation—both before and in the wake 
of the global financial crisis. Residing at its core, as previously discussed, is 
a more honest and sophisticated dialogue within which: (1) regulators are 
more transparent about their expectations and the regulatory outcomes they 
desire to achieve; and (2) regulated actors are more willing to share their 
superior information and expertise with a view to achieving regulatory 
objectives and more forthcoming about the challenges they face in aligning 
their business activities with these objectives.74 The goal of this enhanced 
                                                                                                                 
 71. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 2; Black et al., supra note 
30, at 193. 
 72. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 17. See also Black et al., 
supra note 30, at 200. 
 73. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 17. See also Black, Forms 
and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 439. 
 74. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 8, 17. See also Black, Forms 
and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 439; Ford, Global Financial Crisis, supra note 48. 
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dialogic relationship is to foster “shared understandings”75 between 
regulators and regulated actors regarding their respective roles and 
responsibilities within the regulatory regime, the substantive content of 
principles, and the real world outcomes regulators hope (and can reasonably 
expect) to achieve.76 The cultivation of these shared understandings requires 
the creation of a “new regulatory architecture”77 in the form of “interpretive 
communit[ies].”78 These interpretive communities—made up of regulators, 
regulated actors, and third-party stakeholders (such as industry trade 
associations, investor advocacy groups, and the broader policy 
community79)—constitute the driving force behind MPBR: generating, 
updating, and disseminating substantive and technological content on a 
dynamic basis in response to market and regulatory developments. 
The forth essential element of MPBR is a credible commitment on the 
part of regulators to pursue a policy of intensive supervision and targeted 
and proportional (yet vigorous) enforcement. Supervision and enforcement 
take on special importance within a more principles-based regime for three 
related reasons. First, intensive supervision—that is to say, supervision 
characterized both by a high frequency of interactions and high levels of 
expertise and independence on the part of supervisors—facilitates greater 
information flow between regulators and regulated actors and provides a 
built-in feedback mechanism for communicating regulatory expectations in 
a non-public, non-adversarial fashion.80 Intensive supervision thus forms 
the front line of the enhanced dialogic relationship between regulators and 
regulated actors.81 Second, insofar as MPBR contemplates the devolution of 
responsibility for generating the technological content of principles to 
regulated actors, intensive supervision and the credible threat of 
enforcement are necessary in order to ensure the greatest possible 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Black et al., supra note 30, at 194. As Black et al. explain: 
Whether a rule is clear or certain depends on shared understandings. Just looking at a 
rule does not tell us whether it is certain. . . . Whether or not a rule is “certain” depends 
not so much on whether it is detailed or general, but whether all those applying the rule 
(regulator, regulated firm, court/tribunal) agree on what the rule means. 
Id. 
 76. Id. at 203–04. 
 77. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 8. 
 78. Schwarcz, supra note 70, at 184. 
 79. Ayres and Braithwaite have used the term “tripartism” to describe this sort of participation 
by third-parties within the regulatory process. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 16, at 54–100. 
 80. See Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 35. 
 81. Intensive supervision will be particularly vital during the transition toward a more 
principles-based regime. See Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 443 (examining the 
importance of intensive supervision within the context of the FSA’s role-out of its “Treating 
Customers Fairly” (TCF) Initiative). 
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congruence between private incentives and public regulatory objectives.82 
At the same time, and as described above, MPBR necessitates that 
regulators strike a delicate balance between the use of supervision and 
enforcement to compel compliance and the desire to foster a more honest 
dialogue and stimulate regulatory innovation.83 At the fulcrum of this 
balance is a strategy of targeted and proportional enforcement sensitive to 
whether any given transgression represents a case of well-intentioned 
misjudgment or a more deliberate (or willfully blind) attempt to exploit the 
inherent discretion conferred upon regulated actors under MPBR.84 
Whereas the former may be addressed within the dialogic relationship itself 
without resort to formal enforcement proceedings, the later demands swift 
and decisive action on the part of regulators.85 This dovetails with the final 
reason why intensive supervision and vigorous enforcement are particularly 
important within a more principles-based regime: the need to identify, 
punish, and potentially remove from the marketplace altogether (via de-
licensing) those “bad apples” whose willful misconduct would otherwise 
threaten to erode the mutual trust upon which MPBR is premised. 
Accordingly, while often overlooked by regulators and other observers 
prior to the global financial crisis, intensive supervision and targeted and 
proportional enforcement are clearly vital to the success of MPBR. 
What emerges from the foregoing discussion is that the essential 
elements of MPBR—where they all coalesce—form something of an 
equilibrium. Simultaneously, however, the absence of any one element is 
likely to thwart the implementation, or precipitate the systemic unraveling, 
of a regulatory regime founded upon MPBR. The experiences of the FSA 
are illustrative in this regard: its failure both to foster interpretive 
communities (or engage as a meaningful participant within them) and to 
pursue a policy of intensive supervision and vigorous enforcement 
ultimately undermining its attempts to implement MPBR.86 Indeed, 
regulators seeking to harness the prospective benefits of MPBR must 
address a myriad of potential challenges. 
                                                                                                                 
 82. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 16, at 19–53. The retention of a strong public role for 
supervision and enforcement also serves to distinguish MPBR from various forms of self-
regulation. Id. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 58, at 811–12. 
 83. EXPERT PANEL REPORT, supra note 48, at 20. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 48. To this end, MPBR also requires that a 
robust array of remedial mechanisms (including de-licensing) be available in respect to the 
violation of principles themselves. Id. The “enforcement pyramid” envisioned by Ayres and 
Braithwaite, at the apex of which resides a “benign big gun” (i.e. a regulatory agency with the 
power to de-license regulated actors), would seem an appropriate starting point in devising such a 
model. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 16, at 35–36. 
 86. See Schwarcz, supra note 70, at 183–84.  
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C. THE WISDOM AND POTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF MPBR 
If successfully implemented, the wisdom and prospective benefits of 
MPBR would potentially flow from four primary sources: (1) the 
attenuation of chronic asymmetries of information and expertise between 
financial regulators and regulated actors; (2) greater congruence between 
the private incentives of regulated actors and public regulatory objectives; 
(3) its responsiveness to changing customs, understandings, and new market 
developments; and (4) its durability as a source of regulation. Each 
manifests important advantages in terms of the regulation of financial 
innovation. 
Financial regulators face chronic and potentially severe asymmetries of 
information and expertise vis-à-vis regulated actors.87 These asymmetries 
are products of, inter alia: (1) the high-powered economic incentives 
unique to regulated actors to invest in the acquisition of information and 
expertise; and (2) incomplete and often less than timely access of regulators 
to market and firm-specific information.88 These asymmetries are likely to 
be most pronounced on the cutting edge of financial innovation.89 MPBR 
holds the potential to attenuate—although perhaps not eliminate—these 
asymmetries. As described above, it contemplates that regulated actors will, 
as part of the enhanced dialogic relationship, be more willing to share their 
superior information and expertise with regulators.90 The interpretive 
communities fostered by MPBR—where substantive and technological 
content is continuously generated, updated, and disseminated—can 
similarly be viewed as conduits for the accumulation of information and 
expertise by regulators. Insofar as it can successfully ameliorate these 
asymmetries, MPBR manifests clear benefits for regulators: making them 
more effective supervisors and enforcers and, importantly, more capable of 
playing an active leadership role within interpretive communities. MPBR 
also manifests potential benefits for compliance-oriented regulated actors 
by helping to overcome the adverse selection (or “lemons”)91 problem 
which might otherwise persuade regulators to approach all regulated actors 
and activities with (potentially unwarranted) suspicion. 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Black, Critical Reflections, supra note 56, at 3. See also ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN 
CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 126–27 (1999); Dan 
Awrey, The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives Regulation: Bridging the Public-Private Divide, 11 
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 155, 175–77 (2010) (discussing the regulatory implications of 
information asymmetries); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 
1462 (1997). 
 88. In many cases, of course, these asymmetries will also be the product of the financial 
constraints on regulators. 
 89. See Awrey, supra note 87, at 175–76 (discussing the challenge of information asymmetry 
in the context of increasingly complex financial instruments). 
 90. Whether regulated actors will actually share this information and expertise is something of 
an open question and is, accordingly, explored in greater detail infra. 
 91. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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The global financial crisis serves as a powerful reminder that the 
incentives of private actors will often diverge from the broader public 
welfare. Intuitively, one would expect this divergence to be particularly 
acute within new and innovative financial markets. Within such markets, 
private actors possess powerful incentives to rapidly invest resources with a 
view to capitalizing upon temporarily high profit margins. At precisely the 
same time, however, regulators are likely to encourage caution and restraint 
with a view to identifying the attendant regulatory challenges and crafting 
the appropriate policy response.92 MPBR aims to encourage greater 
congruence between these private incentives and public regulatory 
objectives via several mechanisms.93 First, having been ex ante participants 
in the generation of technological content and within various interpretive 
communities, MPBR implicitly seeks to engender a higher level of 
commitment from regulated actors in terms of ex ante compliance.94 
Second, the articulation of outcome-oriented principles acts as a constraint 
on the discretion that MPBR confers upon regulated actors with respect to 
the design and implementation of technological content, effectively 
minimizing the opportunities for welfare-reducing creative compliance and 
regulatory arbitrage.95 Finally, MPBR leverages the credible threat of swift 
and decisive enforcement action (including de-licensing) in response to the 
violation of regulatory principles in order to recalibrate the incentives of 
those private actors who might otherwise seek to abuse this discretion. 
The third source of prospective benefits flowing from MPBR is its 
inherent capacity to respond to changing customs, understandings, and new 
market developments. As Cristie Ford explains, the benefits of such 
responsiveness are perhaps best understood in juxtaposition to more 
prescriptive, rules-based regulatory approaches: 
The advantage of regulatory principles, as opposed to detailed rules, 
is not that they will remain forever vague, but rather that their content can 
be filled in more dynamically and insightfully by those with the greatest 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Concomitantly, this is also likely to be the point at which the asymmetries of information 
and expertise vis-à-vis regulators and regulated actors will be most acute. 
 93. The advantages of MPBR in terms of the promotion of congruence are particularly clear 
when compared with more prescriptive, rules-based approaches to regulation. Prescriptive rules 
are by their very nature either over-inclusive or under-inclusive and thus promote or deter the 
behavior of regulated actors in ways which are incongruent with their underlying purposes. See 
discussion supra Part I.A. Accordingly, as Ford observes: “prescriptive requirements emphasize 
the wrong things. That is, they encourage firms to focus on detailed compliance rather than to 
exercise sound judgment with a view to the best interests of their clients and the markets.” Ford, 
New Governance, supra note 13, at 19. 
 94. See e.g., Weber, supra note 58, at 847–48. This is the so-called “buy in” argument. See 
John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The 
Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1764 (2007) (in 
the context of the work of the U.K. Takeover Panel); Awrey, supra note 87, at 191 (in the context 
of OTC derivatives regulation). 
 95. Black et al., supra note 30, at 195; Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 438. 
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understanding of the relevant situations. . . . The difference is that their 
content is meant to remain flexible and up to date—that rather than 
ossifying, the principles’ content will continue to evolve, discarding older 
formulations as newer, more comprehensive or effective ones emerge.96 
The responsiveness of MPBR is thus of particular utility (especially 
relative to more prescriptive, rules-based approaches)97 within the context 
of financial markets, where change and innovation are among the only 
constants.98 Importantly, the responsiveness of MPBR—and in particular its 
ability to evolve to reflect new market developments without modification 
to its substantive core—further minimizes the potential opportunities for 
creative compliance and regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, when combined with 
its outcome-oriented focus, the responsiveness of MPBR arguably renders it 
more or less impervious to evasion. 
Finally, the responsiveness of MPBR enhances its durability as a source 
of regulation. The generation of prescriptive rules represents a 
crystallized—and therefore relatively static—response to the prevailing 
conditions within a market, regulatory, and political environment at a 
particular moment in time.99 Thereafter incapable of reflecting changing 
conditions or new learning, rules “ossify” quickly and, thus, require 
constant amendment in order to respond to the rapid pace of change and 
innovation that characterizes modern financial markets.100 In sharp contrast, 
the responsiveness of MPBR enables it to evolve organically in response to 
market developments and new regulatory challenges, often without the need 
for formal regulatory intervention.101 Accordingly, as observed by 
Lawrence Cunningham, “[i]n rapidly changing environments, such as 
securities markets, rules can become obsolete faster than principles.”102 
The wisdom of MPBR is perhaps most intuitively understood in terms 
of the agency and transaction cost implications of the long-term, iterative 
“relational contract”103 formed between regulators and regulated 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 36 (emphasis added). 
 97. Black et al., supra note 30, at 193. 
 98. Weber, supra note 58, at 812–13. Here we find an obvious and important parallel between 
MPBR and new governance. As explained by Weber, “[n]ew governance tools aim to respond to 
the continual changes of regulated society and knowledge itself, so ‘all solutions [to problems] 
should be seen as provisional.’” Id. at 838 (quoting David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New 
Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 539, 542 (2006)). 
 99. See Black et al., supra note 30, at 193. 
 100. Ford, New Governance, supra note 13, at 36. 
 101. Id. at 45. 
 102. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1423 (citing Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and 
the Sudden Death of “May,” 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1265 (2003)). 
 103. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 238 (1979) (citing Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of 
Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 
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actors.104 Viewed from this perspective, the benefits of MPBR in terms of 
enhancing the expertise and information possessed by regulators, promoting 
greater congruence, and responding to uncertain future contingencies can 
each be seen as constraining opportunism (agency costs) on the part of 
regulated actors.105 At the same time, the responsiveness and durability of 
MPBR can be seen as combining to reduce the transaction costs stemming 
from the inevitable adaptation of this relational contract in response to 
changing customs, understandings, and new developments within financial 
markets.106 Notably, this account of the agency and transaction cost 
implications of MPBR as a relational contract diverges markedly from the 
two-dimensional transaction cost analyses rooted in the traditional dialectic 
described above which, as an aside, share many similarities with the 
“classical”107 contract model. 
All of this is not to suggest, however, that any move toward MPBR 
would be somehow “costless.”108 The transition to MPBR would likely 
entail a short-term spike in the costs incurred by regulated actors stemming 
from the overhaul of technological content to reflect desired regulatory 
outcomes. Over the longer term, however, one might expect regulated 
actors to realize an “innovation dividend” flowing from, inter alia, the 
implementation of bespoke regulatory compliance systems (and the 
resulting rationalization of costs) and the extraction of positive network 
externalities from their participation within interpretive communities. 
Indeed, the realization of such dividends may well be imperative in terms of 
garnering a sufficient level of philosophical buy-in from regulated actors. 
For regulators, MPBR would likely entail a somewhat more permanent cost 
increase relative to more prescriptive, rules-based approaches. This increase 
would flow from the need for sustained investment in the infrastructure of 
MPBR: the additional supervisory and relationship management personnel, 
on-going education programs, and enhanced call center capabilities 
necessary to build more dialogic relationships with regulated actors.109 
                                                                                                                 
NW. U. L. REV. 854, 885, 890, 901 (1978)). The relational contract in this example would be the 
entire body of substantive and technological content generated by regulators and regulated actors 
within the context of their long-term, iterative relationship. 
 104. The reason for this intuitiveness is perhaps that the relationship is essentially a contract 
between a licensor (the regulator) and licensee (the regulated actor) wherein the regulator, in 
exchange for certain undertakings (e.g. compliance with regulation), grants the regulated actor a 
license to engage in business activities within the parameters of their registration. 
 105. Although, as described in greater detail below, regulated actors are not the only parties in 
respect to which agency cost concerns arise within the context of MPBR. 
 106. Enhancing the expertise and information possessed by regulators may also generate 
transaction cost benefits to the extent that, after accounting for acquisition costs, regulators are 
able to more cost-effectively identify, understand, and respond to new market developments. 
 107. See Williamson, supra note 103, at 236–37. 
 108. In the sense either of being Pareto optimal or manifesting zero transition costs. 
 109. The FSA, for example, earmarked £50 million to cover non-recurring expenses relating to, 
inter alia, reorganization costs, training and development, and improved knowledge management 
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Ultimately, however, such investments may provide a useful signal to 
regulated actors that regulators are committed to MPBR, thus potentially 
helping to overcome the trust paradox described in greater detail below. 
Financial regulators seeking to harness the prospective benefits of 
MPBR must also address a host of potential challenges. The most 
frequently cited of these challenges, perhaps not surprisingly, emanate from 
the traditional dialectic: a perceived absence of certainty surrounding 
principles resulting in unpredictability in their application.110 Articulated 
somewhat differently, the inherent flexibility of MPBR gives rise to the 
possibility that regulators and regulated actors will fail to arrive at shared 
understandings respecting the scope and/or substantive content of 
principles.111 Understandably, regulated actors do not wish to operate within 
an environment of regulatory uncertainty—especially where there are 
significant costs associated with the risk of “getting it wrong.”112 Within 
such an environment, one might expect some regulated actors to adopt more 
conservative interpretations of principles as a way of mitigating this risk, 
thus generating an unintended “chilling effect.” Julia Black has 
characterized this as the “compliance paradox”113 of MPBR. Insofar as it 
incentivizes regulated actors to err on the side of caution in this way, the 
absence of sufficient certainty and predictability thus runs counter to the 
prevailing current of MPBR—stifling regulatory innovation rather than 
promoting it.114 At the same time, however, this critique ignores the extent 
to which the more honest and sophisticated dialogue and greater mutual 
trust between regulators and regulated actors residing at the heart of MPBR 
may actually serve to enhance the certainty and predictability surrounding 
principles. 
The potential absence of sufficient certainty and predictability also 
raises the prospect of “regulatory creep.”115 The concept of regulatory creep 
proceeds from the premise that regulation—like matter in a gaseous state—
will inevitably expand into any empty space that it encounters. Viewed in 
this light, the flexibility of MPBR introduces the possibility that it may be 
used (and abused) by regulators to expand the reach of the regulatory hand 
into the business activities of regulated actors in a discretionary or arbitrary 
                                                                                                                 
in connection with its transition to a more principles-based regime. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 18. 
 110. Black et al., supra note 30, at 196. 
 111. This possibility is arguably rendered more likely by virtue of the proliferation of guidance 
(and sources of guidance) within the interpretive communities of MPBR. Id. at 197; Nelson, supra 
note 2, at 94. 
 112. Black et al., supra note 30, at 195. 
 113. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 449. 
 114. Carlos Conceicao & Rosalind Gray, Problems of Uncertainty, 26 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 42, 43 
(2007). 
 115. Black et al., supra note 30, at 196. 
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fashion.116 A similar risk arises in connection with the technological 
guidance generated within interpretive communities, where a concern exists 
that industry-developed “recommended,” “good,” or “best” practices will be 
invoked by regulators as an “opaque proxy”117 for prescriptive rules. While 
the risk of regulatory creep is omnipresent, it is particularly acute in the 
context of politically charged environments such as that which has followed 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
The challenges posed by the potential uncertainty and unpredictability 
of principles should not be discounted.118 The two most significant 
challenges, however, stem not from the nature of principles, but rather the 
nature of the relationship which MPBR envisions between regulators and 
regulated actors. The first of these challenges is how to build the mutual 
trust necessary to sustain truly dialogic relationships. As the FSA has 
acknowledged, fostering and maintaining this trust is the “acid test”119 of 
MPBR. However, while the new regulatory architecture of MPBR 
manifests the potential to generate greater mutual trust, a fairly high 
threshold level of trust would instinctively seem necessary at the outset of 
the relationship in order to get MPBR off the ground. Black has 
characterized this as the “trust paradox.”120 Overcoming the trust paradox 
may prove particularly difficult in the current climate, where the global 
financial crisis has served to undermine public confidence in the expertise 
and incentives of both regulators and regulated actors. In the wake of the 
crisis, therefore, it remains an open question whether MPBR can generate 
the level of mutual trust necessary to unlock its inherent potential. 
The second significant challenge posed by the nature of the enhanced 
dialogic relationship is the prospect of regulatory capture. As described 
above, MPBR contemplates close contact and collaboration between 
regulators and regulated actors within the context of both their supervisory 
relationships and as participants within interpretive communities. The 
frequency and intensity of these interactions121 places regulated actors in an 
advantageous strategic position relative to other stakeholders to influence—
over the long-term and in potentially very subtle and sophisticated ways—
the attitudes of regulators and, accordingly, the substantive content of 
regulation.122 The potential for such “soft” capture is exacerbated by the 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1433. 
 117. Mark Wagstaff, Principles Based Regulation: Stability, Risk and Trust 17–18 (Sept. 4, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/Wagstaff_Paper.pdf. 
 118. Although, as previously discussed, the enhanced dialogic relationship and interpretive 
communities contemplated by MPBR are specifically designed to address these challenges. 
 119. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 18. 
 120. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 29, at 456. 
 121. Along with the likely disparity between the resources possessed by regulators and 
regulated actors. 
 122. For an excellent description of how the U.S. banking industry has succeeded in capturing 
both federal banking regulators and the U.S. Congress, primarily by inculcating a pervasive belief 
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chronic asymmetries of information and expertise described above. 
Minimizing the opportunities for capture, and with it the hollowing out of 
substantive regulation by powerful vested interests, is thus of vital 
importance to the success of MPBR. Potential strategies for minimizing 
such opportunities will be explored in Part III. 
It is a testament to the enormity of the foregoing challenges that the 
essential elements of MPBR have yet to be implemented in their entirety in 
any jurisdiction. Even the standard-bearer of MPBR—the FSA—has failed 
thus far to acquire the expertise (or will) necessary to assert itself as an 
active participant within interpretive communities and, thus, as an effective 
counterweight to regulated actors.123 Perhaps more fundamentally, the 
FSA’s adherence to a belief in the self-correcting nature and optimality of 
free and unfettered financial markets prior to the crisis124 undermined both 
the intensity (and focus125) of its supervision and the vigor with which it 
pursued enforcement action. Nevertheless, its inherent promise—combined 
with the potential shortcomings of more prescriptive, rules-based 
approaches—suggests that it is far too early to write MPBR off. Indeed, 
time may well be a critical success factor; time to build mutual trust and 
accrete substantive content. Accordingly, and with a view to the future, the 
time has come to examine a case study illustrating both the wisdom and 
potential challenges of MPBR: the regulation of OTC derivatives markets. 
III. MPBR AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION: THE REGULATION 
OF OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
OTC derivatives markets are the 800-pound gorillas of the global 
financial system.126 At their most basic level, OTC derivatives are 
constructed out of two basic building blocks: options and forwards.127 These 
                                                                                                                 
in the benefits of free markets and their importance in securing America’s global position, see 
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT 
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010). See also Weber, supra note 58 (discussing dynamic cooperation 
between the public and private sectors in the context of new governance). 
 123. Ford, Global Financial Crisis, supra note 48, at 261. 
 124. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE 
TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 86–88 (2009), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. 
 125. Effectively by causing the FSA to shift its focus away from potential systemic risks. Id. 
 126. As of December 2009, the Bank for International Settlements reported the outstanding 
notional value of all OTC derivatives at $615 trillion: several times the global (M3) money 
supply. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW 25 (June 2010), available at 
http://www.bis.org/pub/qtrpdf/r_qt1006.pdf. However, while illuminative of the size and growth 
of derivatives markets, notional value—effectively the benchmark against which cash flows are 
calculated in the context of derivatives transactions—does not provide an accurate picture of value 
actually at risk. This is illustrated, for example, by the fact that while the gross market value of all 
OTC derivatives decreased by 15% between June and December 2009, gross credit exposures fell 
by only 6% during the same period. Id. 
 127. Whereas options represent a contingent right to acquire or dispose of an asset in the future 
at a pre-determined price, forwards represent an obligation to do so. See Ed Murray, UK Financial 
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building blocks can then be combined in an infinite number of ways (and 
with reference to an infinite number of underlying assets), thus giving birth 
to the overwhelming diversity and dazzling complexity observed within 
modern OTC derivatives markets. From “plain vanilla” currency, interest 
rate, and equity-linked swaps, to credit derivatives, complex structured 
notes, and other securitizations, the structure and potential uses of OTC 
derivatives are theoretically as boundless as the imaginations of the Wall 
Street and Canary Wharf “rocket scientists” who create them.128 Put simply, 
OTC derivatives markets are hotbeds of financial innovation. 
The regulation of OTC derivatives markets represents a compelling 
case study for at least two other reasons. First, OTC derivatives played a 
prominent role in both the origins and spread of the global financial crisis. 
Asset-backed securities and complex collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
resided at the heart of the “originate and distribute”129 lending model which 
precipitated the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis. The liquidity crunch 
unleashed by the resulting market uncertainty tore through the balance 
sheets of many financial institutions, sparking the flight of assets and 
collateral calls130 which triggered the near collapse of Bear Stearns,131 the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,132 and the government bailout of AIG 
between March and September 2008.133 Second, as amply illustrated by the 
crisis, OTC derivatives markets pose a number of significant challenges for 
financial regulators.134 Many of these challenges stem from the complexity, 
                                                                                                                 
Derivatives Commodities Markets, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND EXCHANGES LAW 265, 267–70 
(Michael Blair & George Walker eds., 2007); Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-
the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 681; Bernard J. Karol, An Overview of 
Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 195, 195–96 (1995); Adam R. 
Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss?, 
43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1026–28 (1994). While beyond the scope of this Article, developing a 
sufficiently robust definition of derivatives for regulatory purposes has proven problematic. 
 128. For a more comprehensive overview of the taxonomy of OTC derivatives, see generally 
SATYAJIT DAS, THE SWAPS AND FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES LIBRARY (3rd ed. 2006). 
 129. Rather than continuing to hold debt (un-hedged) on its balance sheet, the originate-and-
distribute model contemplates that lenders will repackage debt and distribute it to third party 
investors via securitization. Amongst other implications, this has the effect of eliminating the 
lenders’ exposure to borrower default and, thus, reduces the incentives of lenders to invest 
resources with a view to monitoring creditor quality. 
 130. Many of which were themselves linked to OTC derivatives. 
 131. See The $2 Bailout; Investment Banks, ECONOMIST, Mar. 22, 2008, at 94, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/10881453. 
 132. See ANTON R. VALUKAS, JENNER & BLOCK LLP, LEHMAN BROS. HOLDINGS INC. 
CHAPTER 11 PROCEEDINGS EXAMINERS REPORT 2 (2010), available at 
http://lehmanreport.jenner.com. 
 133. For a detailed account of AIG’s derivatives operations, how they precipitated the firm’s 
downfall, and the subsequent bailouts, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 943 (2009). 
 134. These challenges stem from, inter alia: (1) the size of OTC derivatives markets; (2) the 
complex inter-connections they create between derivative, underlying, and related markets; and 
(3) the opportunities they generate for opportunism, market manipulation, and regulatory 
arbitrage. 
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opacity, and pace of innovation within OTC derivatives markets and, 
accordingly, highlight the chronic asymmetries of information and expertise 
which confront financial regulators. The regulation of OTC derivatives 
markets thus represents a significant—and socially important—real world 
test of the wisdom and prospective benefits of MPBR. 
OTC derivatives markets have historically fallen outside the perimeter 
of U.S. financial regulation.135 The absence of regulatory intervention was 
primarily attributable to a pervasive belief—enshrined in the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA)136—in the societal benefits 
generated by free markets and their role in securing the United States’ 
global position.137 In the wake of the global financial crisis, however, the 
White House, Congress, and U.S. financial regulators have been spurred to 
re-evaluate this non-interventionist stance and determine how best to 
respond to the complexity, opacity, and systemic importance of OTC 
derivatives markets. The centerpiece of the U.S. response was enacted in 
July 2010 as Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act.138 
A. OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
The Obama Administration has characterized the objectives of its new 
approach toward the regulation of OTC derivatives markets as to: (1) guard 
against excessive systemic risk; (2) promote “transparency and efficiency”; 
(3) prevent “market manipulation, fraud, insider trading, and other market 
abuses”; and (4) block inappropriate marketing to unsophisticated parties.139 
The Dodd-Frank Act employs three primary mechanisms in pursuit of these 
                                                                                                                 
 135. From their inception until the enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000), OTC derivatives markets enjoyed a de facto 
exemption from regulation largely attributable to the jurisdictional posturing of the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and federal 
banking regulators. See generally Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivatives 
Security Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279 (1997) (discussing the multiple regulator status of 
financial derivatives and contemplating a shift to a unitary approach). This exemption was 
formalized under the CFMA, which exempted OTC derivatives markets from regulatory oversight 
by the SEC, CFTC and state regulators. 
 136. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763. 
 137. Indeed, this view pervades the 1999 Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets that provided the inspiration for the CFMA. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. 
MARKETS, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 
(1999); see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 122. 
 138. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1570–80 (2010). See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Administration’s 
Regulatory Reform Agenda Reaches New Milestone: Final Piece of Legislative Language 
Delivered to Capital Hill (Aug. 11, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg261.aspx [hereinafter Treasury Press Release] (including the proposed text of the 
Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009). 
 139. Treasury Press Release, supra note 138. 
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objectives.140 First, the Act confers upon the CFTC and SEC the authority 
to require “swaps” and “security-based swaps,”141 respectively, to be 
centrally cleared through CFTC-regulated derivatives clearing organizations 
or through SEC-regulated securities clearing agencies (CCPs142).143 A 
(security-based) swap will be exempt from the central clearing and 
exchange trading requirements if one of the counterparties is not a 
“financial entity”144 or is using the instrument to “hedge or mitigate 
                                                                                                                 
 140. However, not included is the so-called “push out” of (most) derivatives activities of 
federally insured banks to separate non-bank affiliates. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act § 716. Also not included is the so-called “Volcker Rule,” which limits 
proprietary trading of derivatives by bank holding companies. Id. § 619. 
 141. Taken together, the definitions of “swap” and “security-based swap” encompass the vast 
majority of OTC derivatives instruments. See id. §§ 721, 761. That said, the dividing line between 
swaps and security-based swaps is not altogether clear under the Dodd Frank Act, especially with 
respect to swaps based on a portfolio of assets, such as those which often form the subject matter 
of structured finance transactions. 
 142. In very broad terms, CCPs interpose themselves as counterparties to what would otherwise 
be a number of bilateral transactions, thus assuming counterparty risk and centralizing, inter alia, 
clearing and settlement procedures, trading data, and risk management functions. The potential 
benefits of CCPs are discussed in greater detail below. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS &  
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, CONSIDERATIONS 
FOR TRADE REPOSITORIES IN OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS: CONSULTATIVE REPORT 2–3 (2010) 
[hereinafter IOSCO TRADE REPOSITORIES IN OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS REPORT]. 
 143. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 723, 763. The process of 
determining whether a particular group, category, type or class of (security-based) swap will be 
subject to the central clearing and exchange-trading requirements can be initiated by either the 
relevant CCP or the relevant regulator. Id. § 723(h)(2)(A). CCPs are required to submit to the 
CFTC or SEC, as applicable, “any group, category, type, or class of [security-based] swap” it 
intends to accept for clearing and provide notice of this submission to its members. Id.  
§ 723(h)(2)(B)(i). In reviewing a submission, the CFTC or SEC will determine whether the 
submission is consistent with the core principles of the relevant CCP. Id. § 723 (h)(2)(D)(i). The 
relevant regulator is also required to take into account the following factors: 
(I) The existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity, and 
adequate pricing data. 
(II) The availability of a rule framework, capacity, operational expertise and resources, 
and credit support infrastructure to clear the contract on terms that are consistent with 
the material terms and trading conventions on which the contract is then traded. 
(III) The effect on the mitigation of systemic risk, taking into account the size of the 
market for such contract and the resources of the [CCP] available to clear the contract.  
(IV) The effect on competition, including appropriate fees and charges applied to 
clearing. 
(IV) The existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of the insolvency of the 
relevant [CCP] or 1 or more of its clearing members with regard to the treatment of 
customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property. 
Id. § 723(h)(2)(D)(ii). 
 144. Id. § 723(h)(7)(A)(i). The definition of financial entity includes (security-based) swap 
dealers, major (security-based) swap participants, and other categories of financial institution. Id. 
§ 723(h)(7)(C). 
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commercial risk.”145 The principle advantage of centralized clearing and 
settlement is the potential mitigation of counterparty and systemic risk via 
the: (1) multilateral netting of exposures;146 (2) collateralization of residual 
net exposures;147 (3) enforcement of robust risk management standards;148 
and (4) mutualization of losses resulting from clearing member (CM) 
failures.149 The centralization of trade data within CCPs and trade 
repositories (TRs150) also facilitates greater market transparency and, 
accordingly, enables regulators to more effectively monitor systemic risk.151 
Second, the Act requires that all (security-based) swaps subject to the 
central clearing requirement trade on a regulated board of trade, exchange, 
or alternative swap execution facility, thus promoting greater price 
transparency and curbing opportunities for market abuse.152 Un-cleared 
(security-based) swaps are subject to reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.153 In order to incentivize greater utilization of centrally-
cleared and exchange-traded instruments, it is likely that the new regime 
will ultimately impose higher capital and margin requirements in 
connection with un-cleared (security-based) swaps.154 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Id. § 723(7)(A)(ii). This exemption is subject to a notification requirement. The non-
financial or hedging counterparty retains the option to require that the instrument be centrally 
cleared. Id. 
 146. Thus decreasing the complexity and resulting opacity of the interconnections within OTC 
derivatives markets. 
 147. Effectively creating a first loss position which serves as a capital buffer in the event of 
counterparty default. 
 148. By, for example, prescribing rules regarding the appropriate design and implementation of 
stress tests in respect of the financial models utilized by market participants. 
 149. See THE INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MEETING 
NEW CHALLENGES TO STABILITY AND BUILDING A SAFER SYSTEM 97 (2010), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/01/pdf/text.pdf [hereinafter IMF REPORT]. At the 
same time, however, it is important to acknowledge that CCPs concentrate counterparty, and thus 
systemic, risk. 
 150. A TR is a centralized registry that maintains a database of transaction records. TRs “may 
also engage in the management of trade life-cycle events and downstream trade processing 
services.” IOSCO TRADE REPOSITORIES IN OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS REPORT, supra note 
142, at 1. 
 151. See IMF REPORT, supra note 149, at 105–106. 
 152. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 723, 763, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–82, 1762–84 (2010). The execution requirement will not apply 
where (1) no board of trade or swap execution facility makes the swap available to trade or (2) one 
of the counterparties satisfies the commercial end-user exemption to the central clearing 
requirement. Id.  
 153. Id. §§ 729(a)(1), 766(a)(1). These instruments must be reported to a TR or, where a TR is 
unavailable, the relevant regulator. Id.  
 154. See Treasury Press Release, supra note 138. However, the Act only mandates that the 
CFTC, SEC, and federal banking regulators, as applicable, set minimum capital and margin 
requirements. Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act §§ 731(e), 764(e). 
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Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the OTC derivatives dealers,155 
major swap participants (including banks),156 CCPs,157 TRs,158 and 
alternative execution facilities159 (which have over the course of time 
developed into the private regulatory infrastructure supporting many OTC 
derivatives markets), to register with the SEC, CFTC, and/or federal 
banking regulators. Once registered, dealers and major market participants 
are subject to, inter alia, capital, margin, reporting and recordkeeping, and 
business conduct requirements.160 CCPs registered with the CFTC, 
alternative swap execution facilities and TRs, meanwhile, are required to 
comply with a set of “core principles” and other requirements articulated in 
the Act and to design, implement, monitor, and enforce technical regulation 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act §§ 731, 764. The term as defined in 
the Act means: 
[A]ny person who— 
(i) holds itself out as a dealer in [security-based] swaps;  
(ii) makes a market in [security-based] swaps; 
(iii) regularly enters into [security-based] swaps . . . ; or 
(iv) engages in any activity causing the person to be commonly known in the 
trade as a dealer or market maker in [security-based] swaps . . . . 
Id. § 721(a)(49)(A). The definition does not include a person who does not do so as part of a 
regular business. Id. § 721(a)(49)(C). 
 156. Id. §§ 731, 764. The term as defined in the Act means:  
[A]ny person who is not a [security-based] swap dealer and— 
(i) maintains a substantial [net] position in [security-based] swaps for any of 
the major swap categories as determined by the [relevant regulator], 
excluding  
 (I) positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk; 
 . . .  
(ii) whose outstanding swaps create substantial counterparty exposure that 
could have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United 
States banking system or financial markets . . . . 
Id. §721(a)(33)(A). Or is a financial institution falling under the definition of “financial entity” in 
the Act that is highly leveraged, not subject to capital requirements, and maintains a substantial 
net position in outstanding (security-based) swaps for any of the major swap categories as 
determined by the applicable regulator. Id. The definition of a “substantial position” is left to be 
defined by the relevant regulators. Id. 
 157. Id. § 725. 
 158. Id. §§ 728, 763. 
 159. Id. §§ 733, 763. Essentially, OTC derivatives exchanges and other trading platforms. 
 160. Id. §§ 731, 764. The capital and margin requirements apply only in respect of un-cleared 
instruments: these requirements will be set by the relevant CCP in respect of centrally cleared 
instruments. Id. Section 737 also contemplates that the relevant regulator may set position limits 
(excluding bona fide hedges) for (security-based) swaps that perform or affect a significant price 
discovery function with respect to registered entities. Id. § 737. 
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in furtherance of these principles.161 While the Act does not articulate a 
similar set of core principles for CCPs registered with the SEC, it does 
mandate that the agencies adopt consistent and comparable rules governing 
these registrants.162 
The Dodd-Frank Act carves up jurisdiction over OTC derivatives 
markets by distinguishing between contracts for the sale of a commodity for 
future delivery and swaps (subject to CFTC jurisdiction), and security-
based swaps (subject to SEC jurisdiction).163 Simultaneously, however, the 
Act mandates consistency and comparability between SEC and CFTC rules 
and regulations governing functionally or economically similar products 
and entities.164 To this end, the SEC and CFTC have been handed joint 
responsibility for fleshing out many of the technical details of the Act.165 
The Obama Administration also requested that the two agencies produce a 
joint plan for harmonizing the regulation of OTC derivatives markets.166 At 
the same time, innumerable technical issues remain to be resolved. 
Arguably the most pressing are those necessary to ensure that CCPs can 
adequately discharge their systemic protection function under the new 
regime. It is clear that resolving these technical issues will require a high 
level of coordination between the SEC, CFTC, federal banking regulators, 
and their respective registrants. It is equally clear that many of these issues 
reside beyond the traditional competencies of both the SEC and CFTC and, 
what is more, manifest potentially significant divergences between the 
incentives of private actors and public regulatory objectives. As explored in 
greater detail in Part III.B., it is at precisely this point where MPBR can 
play a role. 
B. CARVING OUT A ROLE FOR MPBR 
It is worthwhile acknowledging from the outset that the Dodd-Frank 
Act does not explicitly contemplate a role for MPBR. Indeed, beyond a 
handful of abstract statements made prior to the global financial crisis,167 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Id. §§ 725, 728, 733, 763. 
 162. Id. § 712(a)(7). 
 163. Id. §§ 712, 722, 761–763. 
 164. Id. § 712(a)(7). 
 165. Id. § 712(d)(1). Including the definitions of “swap,” “security-based swap,” “swap dealer,” 
“security-based swap dealer,” “major swap participant,” “major security-based swap participant,” 
and “eligible contract participant.” Id. 
 166. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N & U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, JOINT 
REPORT OF THE SEC AND THE CFTC ON HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION (2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/cftcjointreport101609.pdf [hereinafter JOINT REPORT OF THE 
SEC AND CFTC]. 
 167. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf; MCKINSEY & CO. & N.Y.C. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
CORP., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 
(2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report/_final.pdf. 
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neither Congress, the Treasury Department, nor U.S. financial regulators 
have expressed any appetite for moving toward a more principles-based 
regime.168 Furthermore, the failure of the FSA to either predict the coming 
crisis or to prevent its occurrence has, in some ways unfairly, reflected 
unfavorably on the perceived effectiveness of MPBR.169 Accordingly, 
without further inquiry, one might question the desirability of carving out a 
role for MPBR within the context of OTC derivatives regulation. The 
riposte to this (not unfounded) skepticism is twofold. First, as described 
above, the FSA has yet to successfully implement a regime which exhibits 
all of the essential elements of MPBR. We will simply never know how 
history might have unfolded had the FSA been given more time to achieve 
this (admittedly difficult) objective prior to the crisis.170 Second, and more 
importantly, the pace of innovation, asymmetries of information and 
expertise, and incentive problems which characterize OTC derivatives 
markets will invariably render prescriptive, rule-based regulatory regimes 
obsolete before the ink dries.171 MPBR manifests the potential to overcome 
these challenges and, in the process, generate more responsive, nuanced, 
and effective regulation. Perhaps nowhere is this more clearly illustrated 
than with respect to the regulation of CCPs under the Act. 
The Act rightly identifies CCPs as playing a central role in guarding 
against excessive systemic risk and promoting transparency and efficiency 
within OTC derivatives markets. In furtherance of this role, CCPs 
registered with the CFTC are required to comply with a set of core 
principles relating to, amongst other matters, the maintenance of adequate 
financial resources, participant and product eligibility, risk management, 
settlement procedures, default rules and procedures, rule enforcement, 
system safeguards, regulatory reporting, recordkeeping, information 
sharing, governance, and conflicts of interest.172 These core principles are 
largely derived from a similar set of principles introduced under the CFMA 
and applicable to CFTC-registered CCPs, commodities exchanges, and 
alternative trading platforms for exchange-traded derivatives.173 As 
previously mentioned, the Act contemplates—without providing any 
guidance in terms of how to effect this result—that consistent and 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Other than the CFTC in the view of some observers. However, while the foundation of the 
CFTC’s approach toward the regulation of commodities exchanges and contract markets is 
founded upon a set of “core principles,” it is contestable whether this approach manifests any of 
the other essential elements of MPBR. 
 169. See, e.g., Conceicao & Gray, supra note 114. 
 170. It must be remembered that the FSA is itself only 10 years old and that its principles-based 
regime is still very much an experiment in progress. 
 171. Indeed, the U.S. experience in regulating OTC derivatives markets between 1974 and the 
global financial crisis provides ample evidence of this. See, e.g., Awrey, supra note 87, at 174–89. 
 172. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 725(c), Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1687–92 (2010). 
 173. That is to say, those derivatives, which were traded on exchanges prior to the Act. 
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comparable rules will be adopted by the SEC.174 How MPBR can facilitate 
such substantive harmonization will be explored in greater detail in due 
course. 
The Act bestows upon regulated CCPs wide latitude to design and 
implement rules and procedures (technological content) in furtherance of 
the core principles. This is perhaps not surprising given the myriad 
technical issues associated with the centralized clearing and settlement of 
OTC derivatives. Table 1 contains a non-exhaustive list of major high-level 
technical issues. 
Table 1 
 
 
Major High-Level Technical Issues for CCPs 
 
Product eligibility criteria (i.e. evaluating potential liquidity, susceptibility to manipulation, 
etc.) 
 
CM eligibility criteria (i.e. evaluating financial resources, operational capacity and exper-
tise) 
 
Structure of the lines of defense against CM default (i.e. the capital waterfall) 
 
Methodology for calculating initial and variation margin requirements 
 
Methodology for valuing posted collateral/Quality of collateral requirements 
 
Timing and method of variation margin payments 
 
Methodology for calculating CM contributions toward any CCP guarantee fund within the 
capital waterfall 
 
Emergency liquidity support/Participation by non-defaulting CMs in the event of CM de-
fault (i.e. the portability of positions) and other resolution procedures 
 
 
Many of these high-level technical issues fall outside the traditional 
areas of expertise of financial regulators and/or contemplate timely, 
continuous, and detailed access to (and evaluation of) market and 
counterparty-specific information. 
The methodology for calculating initial and variation margin provides a 
relatively straightforward yet representative example. CCPs seek to 
minimize their residual net exposures (i.e. after multilateral netting) by 
requiring counterparties to post collateral175 at the outset of an OTC 
derivatives contract (initial margin).176 Thereafter, CCPs periodically177 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 712(d)(2)(D), 
763(n)(4)(C). 
 175. Typically either cash or highly liquid securities. 
 176. IMF REPORT, supra note 149, at 4. 
 177. Typically each day. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, GUIDANCE ON THE 
APPLICATION OF THE 2004 CPSS-IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 
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adjust the amount of posted collateral required to keep the contract open in 
order to reflect market fluctuations (variation margin).178 The purpose of 
initial and variation margin is to reduce the exposure of CCPs to 
counterparty and market risk and, thereby, ameliorate the systemic risks 
arising from their potential failure.179 The relevant core principle under the 
Act states as follows: 
(D) Risk Management.— 
. . .  
(iii) LIMITATION OF EXPOSURE TO POTENTIAL LOSSES FROM 
DEFAULTS.—Each derivatives clearing organization, through 
margin requirements and other risk control mechanisms, shall 
limit the exposure of the derivatives clearing organization to 
potential losses from defaults by members and participants of the 
derivatives clearing organization to ensure that— 
(I) the operations of the derivatives clearing organization 
would not be disrupted; and 
(II) nondefaulting members or participants would not be 
exposed to losses that nondefaulting members or participants 
cannot anticipate or control. 
(iv) MARGIN REQUIREMENTS.—The margin required from each 
member and participant of a derivatives clearing organization 
shall be sufficient to cover potential exposures in normal market 
conditions. 
(v) REQUIREMENTS REGARDING MODELS AND PARAMETERS.—
Each model and parameter used in setting margin requirements 
under clause (iv) shall be— 
(I) risk-based; and 
(II) reviewed on a regular basis.180 
The relative simplicity of the principle, however, belies the true 
complexity of its requirements. Calculating initial and variation margins 
requires sophisticated financial models incorporating, amongst other 
variables, historic price volatility, market volatility, and any idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the relevant instrument (for example, the non-linear price 
characteristics and “jump to default” risk181 associated with single-name 
                                                                                                                 
TO OTC DERIVATIVES CCPS 4 (2010) [hereinafter IOSCO RECOMMENDATION FOR CCPs 
REPORT]. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id.; IMF REPORT, supra note 149, at 7. 
 180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 725(c)(2)(D), Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1688–89 (2010). 
 181. To say that a credit default swap exhibits non-linear price characteristics is essentially to 
say that any change in the underlying market conditions or asset prices may be disproportional to 
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credit default swaps).182 Calculating margin also requires CCPs to 
continually monitor counterparty positions with a view to assessing their 
scale, concentration, and risk profile.183 These calculations become even 
more complex where CCPs engage in “portfolio margining” across all of a 
counterparty’s open positions.184 The financial models used by CCPs 
require rigorous and ongoing back-testing and stress-testing in order to 
evaluate their robustness during periods of market distress.185 What is more, 
these models must be recalibrated to reflect relevant market developments 
such as evolving relationships between financial markets and, importantly, 
the introduction of new and innovative financial instruments.186 All of these 
processes demand subjective judgments by personnel with technical 
expertise and experience in, amongst other areas, stochastic modeling.187 
The majority of financial regulators are quite simply out of their depth 
when it comes to these and other similar technical issues.188 
The relative dearth of expertise possessed by regulators with respect to 
many of the technical issues associated with the centralized clearing and 
settlement of OTC derivatives does not bode well in terms of the ability of 
the either the SEC or CFTC to monitor compliance with the Act. This 
dearth becomes even more foreboding when one realizes that these 
technical issues: (1) are central to achieving the policy objectives 
underlying the Act; and (2) manifest latent incentive problems. Table 2 sets 
out the same non-exhaustive list of major high-level technical issues, this 
time alongside their attendant public policy objectives and latent incentive 
problems. 
                                                                                                                 
the resulting impact on the value of the swap. Jump-to-default risk, meanwhile, is the risk that the 
reference credit will go from non-default to default so rapidly that the market will not have an 
opportunity to incorporate the increased default risk associated with its movement towards default 
into the swap’s current credit spread. 
 182. See IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CCPs REPORT, supra note 177, at 14. 
 183. See id. 
 184. Where, as a result, the correlations between various financial instruments and markets 
become particularly important. 
 185. IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CCPs REPORT, supra note 177, at 14–15. 
 186. See id. at 4–5, 14. 
 187. And, ideally, an appreciation for the limits of stochastic models (which are premised on 
randomness) within increasingly interconnected global financial markets. 
 188. See Waldman, supra note 127, at 1080. This is not to suggest, of course, that all regulators 
were created equal in this regard: the CFTC for example has developed some potentially 
transferrable expertise with respect to centralized clearing and settlement of exchange-traded 
derivatives. Also, the CPSS-IOSCO joint working group has exhibited a firm grasp of the 
complexity of many of these technical issues, if not necessarily how they should be resolved. See 
IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CCPs REPORT, supra note 177. 
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Table 2 
 
 
Major High-Level Technical Issues for CCPs,  
Attendant Public Policy Objectives, and Latent Incentive Problems 
 
Technical Issue Public Policy 
Objectives  
Latent Incentive  
Problems189 
Product eligibility 
criteria (i.e. evaluat-
ing potential liquidity, 
susceptibility to ma-
nipulation, etc.) 
 
Ensuring that the broadest poss-
ible range of products is subject 
to the centralized clearing and 
exchange-trading requirements 
arguably furthers all of the 
stated objectives of the Act190 
CCPs may be compelled by 
competitive pressures (or to 
extract network externalities 
or economies of scale) to ex-
pand the universe of eligible 
products, even where they 
exhibit little or no economic 
value or manifest potential 
systemic risks 
CM eligibility criteria 
(i.e. evaluating finan-
cial resources, opera-
tional capacity and 
expertise) 
 
Ensuring that CMs possess 
sufficient financial resources, 
operational capacity and exper-
tise minimizes the likelihood of 
CM default (thereby furthering 
the systemic protection objec-
tive of the Act) 
CCPs may be compelled by 
competitive pressures to adopt 
less stringent eligibility crite-
ria, even where doing so in-
creases the likelihood of CM 
default  
Structure of the lines 
of defense against 
CM default (i.e. the 
capital waterfall) 
 
Ensuring that CCPs possess 
adequate financial resources to 
withstand periods of market 
distress and CM defaults mini-
mizes the likelihood of CCP 
failure; appropriate mechanisms 
for mutualizing losses amongst 
CMs minimize moral hazard 
(thereby furthering the systemic 
protection objective of the Act) 
 
CCPs may be compelled by 
competitive pressures to struc-
ture lines of defense to the 
benefit of counterparties (by, 
for example, imposing lower 
margin requirements or ac-
cepting lower quality collater-
al) or CMs (by, for example, 
not requiring them to contri-
bute toward a CCP guarantee 
fund), even where doing so 
undermines their ability to 
withstand periods of market 
distress or CM defaults 
Methodology for 
calculating initial and 
variation margin re-
quirements 
Employing a prudent methodol-
ogy for calculating margin re-
quirements minimizes the resi-
dual exposure of CCPs to coun-
terparty and market risk (there-
by furthering the systemic pro-
tection objective of the Act) 
CCPs may be compelled by 
competitive pressures to em-
ploy methodologies which 
systematically under-estimate 
prudent margin requirements  
                                                                                                                 
 189. Many of these latent incentive problems rely at least in part on assumptions respecting: (1) 
the existence of a competitive market for CCPs and/or low price elasticities of demand as between 
cleared and un-cleared instruments; and/or (2) the preference of decision-makers for current 
(enhanced revenues) over potential future (losses stemming from the realization of systemic or 
other risks) consumption. 
 190. Although it is contestable whether casting such a broad net will actually enhance 
efficiency. Furthermore, to the extent that imposing centralized clearing requirements on the 
broadest possible range of instruments serves to concentrate counterparty and operational risk 
within CCPs, it may actually exacerbate systemic risk. 
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What becomes immediately apparent on the face of Table 2 is that 
CCPs are likely to face significant competitive and other pressures 
incentivizing them to generate technological content which may be 
incongruent with the policy objectives underlying the Act. 
Returning to our margin example, it can be expected that the 
opportunity costs of posting collateral will drive counterparties and CMs to 
clear trades through the CCPs which impose the least onerous initial and 
variation margin requirements.191 Indeed, so great are the perceived 
opportunity costs that large commercial counterparties have expended 
considerable financial and political capital lobbying lawmakers in both the 
U.S192 and E.U.193 for exemptions from these requirements on the basis that 
they make it too costly for businesses to use derivatives to manage risk.194 
In the U.S., these efforts have yielded exemptions from the central clearing 
and exchange trading requirements for commercial end-users using 
(security-based) swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial risk.195 These 
efforts also induced Senators Chris Dodd and Blanche Lincoln,196 in 
response to industry concerns that the Act was ambiguous in this regard, to 
send a letter to Representatives Barney Frank and Colin Peterson197 
confirming that the margin and capital requirements imposed on (security-
based) swap dealers and major (security-based) swap participants in 
connection with un-cleared instruments were not to be imposed on 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Reform of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market: Limitless Risk and Ensuring Fairness 
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 185 (2009) (statement of René M. Stulz, Everett 
D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Econ., Ohio State Univ.); IMF REPORT, supra note 149, 
at 26. 
 192. See, e.g., Hal Weitzman, Exemption Sought to OTC Derivatives Rules, FIN. TIMES 
(London), May 12, 2010, at 4 (discussing the efforts of the Coalition for Derivatives End-Users). 
See also Damian Paletta, Democrats Deny Buffett on a Key Provision, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2010, 
at A4. 
 193. See, e.g., Consultation Document: Possible Initiatives to Enhance the Resilience of OTC 
Derivatives Markets, COM (2009) 332 final (July 3, 2009). 
 194. Most often interest rate and foreign exchange risk. 
 195. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 723(h)(7), Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1679 (2010). 
 196. Respectively, the former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs and former Chairwoman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and 
Forestry. History of the Chairmen of the Senate Banking Committee. U.S. S. COMM. ON 
BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_files/Chairmenof 
theSenateBankingCommittee.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2011); Blanche Lincoln Biography, U.S. S. 
COMM. ON AGRIC., NUTRITION & FORESTRY, http://www.ag.senate.gov/site/lincolnbio.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2011). 
 197. Respectively, the Ranking Members of the House Committee on Financial Services and 
House Committee on Agriculture. Who We Are: the Full Committee, H.R. COMM. ON FIN. 
SERVS., http://www.financialservices.house.gov/singlepages.aspx?NewsID=397 (last visited Mar. 
2, 2011); Committee Members, H.R. COMM. ON AGRIC.–DEMOCRATS, 
http://democrates.agriculture.house.gov/singlepages.aspx?NewsID=34&LSBID=23|69 (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2011). 
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commercial end-users.198 While potentially warranted, these carve-outs cut 
against the grain of the systemic protection objective of the Act. At the 
same time, however, the prospect of financial regulators imposing bright-
line margin requirements across the board would also appear to be sub-
optimal insofar as these requirements would not reflect market, 
counterparty or product-specific risk factors. 
By now the broad strokes of a potential role for MPBR should be 
starting to take shape. On the assumption that it can be successfully 
implemented,199 the mutual trust, enhanced dialogic relationships, and 
interpretive communities thereby generated could be leveraged to tap the 
accumulated information and expertise of CCPs, CMs, and major 
counterparties, thereby attenuating the twin asymmetries which confront 
financial regulators. This transfer of information and expertise could then 
be brought to bear on more intensive supervision of CCPs and other market 
participants. More expert regulators possessed of more timely, accurate, and 
complete market- and firm-specific information would also serve to make 
the threat of swift and decisive enforcement more credible. As previously 
described, more intensive supervision and the credible threat of 
enforcement would ultimately serve to better align the incentives of private 
actors with the policy objectives underlying the Act, thus providing some 
measure of protection from, for example, the hollowing out of its systemic 
protection mandate due to competitive pressures on CCPs. 
Enhancing the information and expertise possessed by regulators would 
also enable them to play a more meaningful leadership role within 
interpretive communities. Indeed, the new regulatory architecture 
envisioned by MPBR may prove particularly well suited to the task of 
fleshing out the innumerable (and often highly complex) outstanding 
technical issues under the Act which have been relegated to the post-
enactment rulemaking process.200 By way of example, the accumulated 
expertise within interpretive communities could be leveraged to help 
generate substantive and technological content surrounding such key 
concepts as: (1) the requirement that CCPs maintain financial resources 
sufficient to meet their obligations to CMs and counterparties in “extreme 
but plausible market conditions;”201 (2) the quantitative and qualitative 
elements of a “substantial position” for the purpose of determining whether 
a market participant constitutes a major (security-based) swap 
                                                                                                                 
 198. See Damian Paletta, Late Change Sparks Outcry Over Finance-Overhaul Bill, WALL ST. 
J., July 2, 2010, at A4. 
 199. The reasonableness of this assumption is examined in greater detail infra. 
 200. The law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell has estimated that the Act contemplates the creation 
of 243 new formal rules. Editorial, The Uncertainty Principle, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2010, at A18 
[hereinafter The Uncertainty Principle]. 
 201. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 725(c)(2)(B)–(C), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1688 (2010). 
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participant;202 and (3) the definition of “hedging” and, thus, the scope of the 
commercial end-user exemptions from central clearing and exchange 
trading requirements.203 Interpretive communities could also help channel 
industry expertise with a view to fleshing out the anemic criteria which 
regulators must take into account when determining whether a (security-
based) swap should be subject to the central clearing and exchange trading 
requirements. More broadly, interpretive communities comprised of 
regulators, regulated actors, and other stakeholders could provide a solid 
foundation from which to address the “trillion unintended consequences”204 
which many observers believe reside within the Act’s 848 pages.205 
Another prospective benefit of carving out a role for MPBR stems from 
its capacity to facilitate substantive harmonization. As described above, the 
Act mandates consistency and comparability between SEC and CFTC rules 
governing, inter alia, CCPs. This requirement exists notwithstanding vast 
differences between the statutory frameworks (and institutional cultures) of 
the two, often feuding, agencies. Perhaps most significantly, whereas the 
SEC’s statutory framework under the Securities Act of 1933206 and 
Exchange Act of 1934207 is predominantly rules-based, the CFTC’s 
approach toward the regulation of CCPs, commodity exchanges, and 
alternative trading platforms is (as we have already seen) founded upon a 
set of broad principles. MPBR holds the potential to bridge this formal 
divide by focusing instead on the articulation and subsequent realization of 
desired regulatory outcomes.208 For the same reason, MPBR can also 
facilitate substantive harmonization between the U.S. and other emerging 
national (and supranational209) regulatory regimes governing OTC 
derivatives markets. Indeed, enhanced international coordination amongst 
financial regulators with a view to monitoring systemic risks and ensuring 
substantive harmonization is a strategic necessity given: (1) the globalized 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Id. § 721(a)(33). 
 203. Id. § 723(h)(7). 
 204. See A Trillion Unintended Consequences, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2010, at A16. 
 205. A number commentators have described the Act as running to approximately 2,300 pages. 
See The Uncertainty Principle, supra note 200. However, the version of the Act on file with the 
Library of Congress only runs to 848 pages. 
 206. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa 
(2006)). 
 207. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–78nn (2006)). 
 208. And, furthermore, by emphasizing the importance of dialogue. 
 209. Such as, for example, that which is starting to emerge from the E.U. See European 
Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Commission Communication, Ensuring 
Efficient, Safe and Sound Derivatives Markets, COM (2009) 332 final (July 3, 2009) [hereinafter 
EC Working Paper]; EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK & COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES 
REGULATORS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (May 2009) 
[hereinafter CESR RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/data/document/ 
09_627.pdf. 
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nature of OTC derivatives markets; (2) competitive pressures to establish 
cross-border links between CCPs and trading platforms;210 and (3) the 
existence of markedly different systems governing, amongst other areas, 
bankruptcy, property,211 and contract212 law across 
jurisdictions.213 Most importantly, however, substantive harmonization at 
both the domestic and international level is essential in order to minimize 
the corrosive systemic effects of regulatory arbitrage. Insofar as its 
outcome-oriented focus is able to promote greater harmonization, MPBR is 
thus very likely to have a positive impact in terms of the overall 
effectiveness of OTC derivatives regulation. 
All of this is not to suggest that the wisdom and prospective benefits of 
MPBR will be revealed and accrue predominantly at the early, formative 
stages of global OTC derivatives regulation. It is all but certain that the 
forces of change and innovation will continue to shape financial markets. 
New financial instruments and institutions will be created, new methods for 
measuring and managing various risks will be developed, relationships 
between financial markets will continue to evolve. Many of these 
developments will raise novel and complex issues. As these developments 
unfold, the hallmarks of MPBR—greater expertise, enhanced dialogic 
relationships, and interpretive communities—will enable regulators to 
mount more timely, nuanced, and effective responses to their attendant 
regulatory challenges. Simultaneously, the responsiveness of MPBR, 
buttressed by the durability of its outcome-oriented substantive core, will 
serve to deter socially useless forms of innovation motivated by, perhaps 
most glaringly, regulatory arbitrage. The responsiveness and durability of 
MPBR are thus very much geared toward generating benefits over the long 
term. 
The prospective benefits described above combine to make a persuasive 
case for carving out a role for MPBR within the context of OTC derivatives 
regulation. But what about the potential challenges? As a preliminary 
matter, it is worth observing that the durability of MPBR—along with its 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See IMF REPORT, supra note 149, at 20–21, 23. 
 211. For example, legal rules impacting both the possibility and feasibility of segregating 
counterparty and CM assets (i.e. cash and securities posted as collateral) within a CCP vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See ALLIANCE BERNSTEIN ET AL., REPORT TO THE SUPERVISORS OF 
THE MAJOR OTC DERIVATIVES DEALERS ON PROPOSALS OF CENTRALIZED CDS CLEARING 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE SEGREGATION AND PORTABILITY OF CUSTOMER CDS POSITIONS AND 
RELATED MARGIN 5–22 (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/ 
Full_Report.pdf. 
 212. For example, the contractual concept of novation is the most common method by which 
CMs assign derivatives transactions to CCPs. However, this concept is not a universal feature of 
contract law and, thus, the legal method by which CCPs interpose themselves into a transaction 
may vary across jurisdictions. 
 213. EC Working Paper, supra note 209; CESR RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 209, at 92, 
150–52; IOSCO RECOMMENDATION FOR CCPS REPORT, supra note 177, at 9, 26; IMF REPORT, 
supra note 149. 
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capacity to enhance the certainty and predictability surrounding key 
concepts—confound the predictions of the traditional dialectic in terms of 
the challenges flowing from the utilization of principles. The real 
challenges associated with the implementation of MPBR arise instead from 
the nature of the relationship it envisions between regulators and regulated 
actors and, more specifically, the dual (and in some ways conflicting) 
imperatives of building mutual trust whilst at the same time minimizing the 
potential for regulatory capture. 
The iterative, dialogic relationship between regulator and regulated 
actors which characterizes MPBR raises the specter of capture and, with it, 
the eventual dilution of the systemic and other protections potentially 
afforded by the Act. The challenge of minimizing the potential for capture 
would need to be approached from several angles. First, the SEC and 
CFTC214 would require the legal authority, remedial powers, and resources 
necessary to undertake intensive supervision and maintain a strong 
(background) enforcement presence.215 In terms of the regulation of CCPs, 
this would mean providing regulators with, inter alia: (1) a wide range of 
enforcement powers available in connection with the violation of core 
principles by CCPs, CMs, and counterparties;216 and (2) broad “emergency” 
powers enabling regulatory intervention during periods of market distress. 
Second, the governance structure of CCPs would need to be structured so as 
to establish clear lines of communication with, and accountability to, the 
relevant regulator(s). Accompanying these structures would ideally be 
mechanisms designed to render transparent the decision-making processes 
of CCPs in terms of the generation of technological content—particularly 
with respect to their risk management practices.217 Third, regulators would 
have to make a concerted effort to identify and attract appropriate third 
party stakeholders into interpretive communities.218 To the extent that the 
interests of these stakeholders are sufficiently diverse, their views could 
serve to filter out potential distortions in the perspectives advanced by more 
vested interests. Finally, and along the same vein, regulators would need to 
                                                                                                                 
 214. And, as applicable, federal banking regulators. 
 215. The CFTC, for example, has recently acknowledged that it lacks sufficient authority: (1) to 
ensure that exchanges and CCPs it regulates “are operating within the principles, rules and 
regulations established under” its enabling legislation; (2) to “adapt to market conditions and 
international standards”; (3) to “protect the public”; and (4) over disruptive trading practices. 
JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND CFTC, supra note 166, at 11–13. 
 216. By implication, this would necessitate: (1) the extension of core principles for CFTC-
registered CCPs to SEC registered CCPs; and (2) the development of a set of core principles for 
both CMs and counterparties. 
 217. By, for example, requiring CCPs to publicly disclose their methodologies (including their 
underlying assumptions) for calculating initial and variation margin requirements, along with the 
reasons why they believe their methodologies are aligned with the objectives of the Act. 
 218. With respect to the regulation of CCPs, such stakeholders might include policy analysts 
and scholars in the fields of economics, finance, and law. In other areas, investor advocacy groups 
might also play a meaningful role. 
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leverage their new found expertise with a view to developing their own 
“political economy filters.”219 Collectively, these strategies can minimize—
though perhaps not foreclose—the possibility of capture. 
The second challenge is how to build the mutual trust necessary to 
foster the enhanced dialogic relationships and interpretive communities 
from which the prospective benefits of MPBR largely flow. This challenge 
looms large in the wake of the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, the 
regulation of CCPs under the Act arguably provides a unique window of 
opportunity to overcome this trust paradox for three reasons. First, the 
CFTC has already acquired potentially transferrable experience forging 
relationships with regulated actors on the basis of a regulatory framework 
founded upon broad principles.220 Second, the fact that CCPs are essentially 
a new species of regulated actor might allow all parties concerned to enter 
the relationship with a relatively clean slate. That CCPs were considered by 
most observers to have performed well during the crisis would no doubt 
prove helpful in this respect.221 Third, carving out a role within the 
relatively circumscribed context of the regulation of CCPs would enable 
regulators to employ incrementalism as a means of establishing a credible 
commitment to MPBR.222 The objective in this regard would be to create a 
virtuous circle whereby establishing a credible commitment would enhance 
mutual trust, thereby generating the benefits described above and, 
ultimately, facilitating an expansion of the potential role for MPBR. 
Simultaneously, incrementalism interposes a natural circuit breaker: where 
the prospective benefits of MPBR fail to materialize (or its challenges are 
deemed too great) it serves to contain the sunk and transition costs of, in 
effect, unwinding the experiment. 
IV. MPBR AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION: BROADER 
APPLICATIONS 
In theory, the prospective benefits of MPBR—especially in terms of its 
responsiveness and durability—most strongly resonate within environments 
exhibiting high rates of change and innovation. Looking across the entire 
panoply of institutions, instruments, and activities within global financial 
markets, this suggests that MPBR is likely to generate the greatest benefits 
                                                                                                                 
 219. The effectiveness of this filter could be enhanced by: (1) enforcing a rotation policy for 
regulatory personnel working on particular technical issues or supervising particular CCPs; and 
(2) limiting the ability of supervisory personnel, subsequent to their departure from the regulator, 
to accept employment (or other benefits) from regulated actors which they had previously 
supervised. 
 220. The SEC would, to a certain extent, have to play catch-up in this regard. 
 221. See, e.g., EC Working Paper, supra note 209, at § 2.4.2.1; IMF REPORT, supra note 149, at 
2. 
 222. For a more complete description of the rationale underlying this strategy, see AVINASH K. 
DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN 
BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 157–58 (1991). 
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in the area of financial product regulation. At the same time, as illustrated 
by the CCP example, the capacity of MPBR to ameliorate asymmetries of 
information and expertise and realign the incentives of private actors opens 
the door to a potentially broader role in connection with conduct of business 
and prudential regulation. Ultimately, however, the broader applications of 
MPBR must be determined on the basis of their relative costs: the 
transaction costs of regulation, the agency cost implications for both 
regulators and regulated actors, and the social costs of (in)effective 
financial regulation. It is noteworthy in this regard that the enhanced 
dialogic relationships and interpretive communities of MPBR can be 
leveraged to yield more robust cost-benefit analyses. Furthermore, it bears 
reminding that MPBR does not preclude the utilization of regulatory tools 
formulated on the basis of prescriptive rules. Indeed, this may be the 
ultimate wisdom of MPBR: that it neither preordains nor envisions as static 
the optimal solutions to the myriad potential challenges associated with the 
regulation of complex and evolving global financial markets. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern financial markets are characterized by complexity, seemingly 
perpetual innovation, chronic asymmetries of information and expertise, 
and pervasive agency costs. Perhaps nowhere are these characteristics—or 
their attendant regulatory challenges—more pronounced than within OTC 
derivatives markets. Mounting effective responses to these challenges must 
be considered amongst the most difficult and important tasks confronting 
financial regulators. Prescriptive, rules-based approaches toward financial 
regulation have thus far proven inadequate to this task. Through the 
utilization of outcome-oriented principles, enhanced dialogic relationships, 
intensive supervision, and targeted and proportional (yet vigorous) 
enforcement, MPBR manifests the potential to overcome these challenges 
and, in the process, generate more nuanced, responsive, durable, and 
effective regulation. It remains an open question, however, whether MPBR 
can successfully conquer its own challenges in terms of how to insulate 
itself from regulatory capture and build mutual trust between regulators and 
regulated actors. Nevertheless, if these challenges can be bested, carving 
out a role for MPBR may well prove the optimal prescription for regulating 
financial innovation and, perhaps, beyond. 
